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Recent Posts in Equitable Distribution Category
| August 20, 2010 |
| Recent Case Regarding Equitable Distribution and Maintenance |
| Posted By Brian Perskin |
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See below case concerning equitable distribution and maintenance:
E.S.—Plaintiff v. L.R.S.—Defendant, 350249/07
Supreme Court, New York County, Part 31
Family Law
Decided: August 11, 2010
TRIAL DECISION AND ORDER
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The issues in this divorce action are equitable distribution of the marital assets and liabilities; maintenance and various issues arising from the pendente lite support orders; and attorney and expert fees. A trial was conducted on October 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 28 and 30, 2009. It was agreed by the parties that the issue of attorney and expert fees would be addressed in papers that were submitted by counsel. Each party submitted a post-trial brief and reply brief. The court has reviewed all submitted papers. During the trial, the plaintiff (the "Wife") presented evidence, without opposition, warranting a divorce on the grounds of constructive abandonment.
The parties married on June 27, 1981 in a religious ceremony in New York County. The Wife is 55 years old and the Defendant (the "Husband") is 58 years old. There are two children of the marriage, a son (born May 1983) and daughter (born February 2, 1985). Each child is emancipated although as of trial, the daughter still attended college on a part time basis.
Prior to the marriage, the Husband worked for his family's wholesale business, Interstate Cigar. He was fired from that job early in the marriage in 1985. He then set up his own wholesale business. The business operated under several names, including International Trade Expo ("ITE"), Allstate Clearing, Inc. ("Allstate") and, in 2000, Betlar Merchandising ("Betlar"). Except during the very early years of the business when the Husband had a partner, the Husband was the sole owner of these business entities.
The Husband's corporations engaged in what he called an opportunistic purchasing business, commonly referred to as "grey market" activity or diversion of product. Manufacturers in the United States produced and sold product overseas which the manufacturers intended for resale outside of the United States. These products were typically sold overseas for a lower price than comparable products sold within the United States. Working with agents in foreign countries, the Husband purchased the product intended for overseas markets, and upon its re-
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delivery in the United States, sold the product to wholesalers at a price lower than if purchased directly from the manufacturer in the United States. Most of the products sold by the Husband's business were grocery items. The rest of the items were beauty or hair salon products.
Typically, ITE and, later, Betlar purchased the product with funds wired to overseas agents. Upon receiving the product, the company would warehouse the product, prepare it for resale (which sometimes required removing identification numbers), and deliver the product to the purchaser within the United States. Upon receiving payment for the product, the Husband calculated the percentage due to him for costs incurred and would then share profits on a deal-by-deal basis with the overseas agents. The money sent overseas might include in one transfer profits from a prior sale and payment for future product or just one or the other. ITE did not itself transfer the money overseas as a result of a lawsuit brought against ITE by Clorox. The Husband decided it was best to separate the buying and selling operations. Instead, ITE transferred money to Allstate which sent the funds overseas. Most frequently, Allstate wired money to Fortuna Trading Co. ("Fortuna"), an entity with a bank account in the Channel Islands, but other overseas business entities received funds from Allstate too. Fortuna was a business entity owned by Daniel Akerib, the Husband's primary overseas agent.
The Husband's business was run out of a studio apartment located in the same building where the parties resided, 425 East 58th Street, New York, New York (the "Studio Apartment"). Ultimately, the parties purchased the Studio Apartment.
The Wife, a college graduate, worked in sales before and early in the marriage. She sold cosmetics retail and then sold advertising for a magazine. She also worked in sales for her father's dress manufacturing business and as a secretary. She stopped working with the birth of the parties' first child. In 1991, once both children were in school, the Wife worked for the Husband's business. She became an integral part of its operation. The Husband often spent weeks traveling in Asia and Africa developing contacts with overseas agents. He testified that he traveled 25-30 percent of the time, although he traveled less in later years. The Wife managed the office. She maintained most of the companies' books and records and was responsible for wiring payments. She created and maintained the files for each deal. She tracked receipts and had contact with the various agents who worked for the business when they came to the office. She provided records to the accountant. She did not set the prices for any deal; the Husband determined the price. But the Wife spoke to the Husband, often several times a day when he was out of the country, to have him tell her at what price to buy or sell product. She then completed the deal.
The Wife also oversaw the family's finances. She deposited into the family's bank accounts all funds received from the business either as salary or distribution of profit and paid all of the family's bills. The parties maintained a joint account, but the Wife also maintained her own account. The Husband's salary received from his business over the years was typically in the range of $70-90,000 as reported on tax returns. The reported distributions received from the company averaged around $200,000-250,000 (but were significantly less in some years) (Ex. 8). The Wife testified that some of the family's bills were paid by her through the business. She testified that she also received for herself unreported "salary" of $1,700 to $1,900 a week from the business which she deposited into her own account.
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At the time the parties' married, the Husband's family held stock in a company called Bambu Sales, Inc. ("Bambu"). The company manufactured and sold to wholesalers cigarette rolling paper. The rolling paper is commonly known to be used for smoking marijuana, although there is no evidence that Bambu was involved in the drug trade. The Husband did not own stock at the time of the marriage, but he received Bambu shares at three different points during the marriage: 1991, 1994 and 2005. In 1997, the Husband began to receive a salary from Bambu in the amount of $1,000 to $1,200 a week. Not only did this provide some additional money to the family, but it also enabled the parties to receive medical insurance through Bambu. The Husband also received approximately $700 a month to lease a car. As a shareholder, the Husband received distribution checks quarterly, although some portion of the distribution was used to pay taxes. The Wife testified that she often deposited the weekly salary received from Bambu into her own bank account.
From the proceeds received from the Husband's business and Bambu, the parties lived a very comfortable lifestyle. They initially lived in an apartment owned by the Husband's father at 425 East 58th Street, New York, New York. In 1989, the Husband's father gifted the apartment to the parties. In 1994, the parties sold that apartment and purchased a 3 bedroom apartment in the same building for $875,000 (the "Marital Apartment"). The parties spent $500,000 renovating the apartment. They also acquired two brownstones in the Red Hook section of Brooklyn and a vacant lot as investment properties. The parties employed a full time housekeeper/nanny. The children attended private schools, camp and participated in paid extracurricular activities. They had tutors. The couple purchased significant pieces of jewelry (although neither party placed a value on the jewelry acquired) and the Husband collected and traded motorcycles (the Wife testified that he spent approximately $350,000 on motorcycles over the years of the marriage). The parties rented vacation homes in the Hamptons for a number of years. They enjoyed occasional vacations in Italy, the Far East, and Florida, often related to business. They frequently dined in restaurants, Peter Luger's Steakhouse being a particular favorite.
By 1999, the parties experienced serious marital difficulties. The Husband came to learn that the Wife had an affair in 1996 with someone known to him. She commenced a divorce proceeding in 1999, but withdrew the action. The couple sought to reconcile and engaged in therapy. The Husband testified that as a result of learning of his Wife's infidelity, he gained significant weight and developed diabetes. He acknowledged that he too had an affair sometime after he learned of the Wife's affair. He claimed he lost interest in the business, but the evidence also revealed that the Husband created Betlar in 2000. The effort to reconcile failed. The Husband began to do less work for the business. Both parties agree that by 2005 the business was largely defunct, but they were able to draw money from the business for a time thereafter. The Husband's ownership share in Bambu had grown to 25.314 percent by 2005 and the distributions he receives have significantly increased.
Notwithstanding the reconciliation efforts, the Wife testified that she knew the marriage was dead in 1999. In 2004 she retained a divorce attorney who she met with 15 times in 2005 and 10 times in 2006. The Wife acknowledged that for several years preceding the divorce action, she alone used the Studio Apartment and that the Husband stopped coming to work. The
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Husband testified that he was last in the Studio Apartment in 2006 on one occasion for a short period of time. The Wife commenced this action in 2007.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY
To distribute the parties' assets and liabilities, the court must first determine what constitutes marital property and the value of that property.
The Assets
Overseas Funds of ITE, Allstate and Betlar
The Wife contends that the Husband hid profits from his business in overseas accounts funneled primarily through Allstate to Fortuna in the Channel Islands, a Swiss bank account and to accounts in the Far East. She claims she did not realize the Husband was doing this until after the divorce action began when she reviewed some wire transfers. She testified that she confronted her Husband about the money and he said "You'll never find it."
In support of her position, she presented a report prepared by Holtz Rubenstein and Reminick ("HRR") (Ex. 80) and the testimony of an expert forensic accountant with that firm. After his review of the available business documents and certain depositions in this action, the accountant estimated that $13.4 million of the business' gross profits were unaccounted for. It is the Wife's position that the Husband drained this amount of money from the business.
Although copies of the business' and the parties' personal tax returns were provided, the accountant acknowledged that he had very few other business records available for review. All of the records had been maintained in the Studio Apartment. Both parties testified that a file was maintained for each deal entered into by the business. The file would include the date and cost of the purchase of product from overseas, records that the product was delivered to the warehouse, sale of the product to a wholesaler, and all wire transfers that occurred relative to the sale. Both parties concede that most of these records no longer exist. The accountant conducted his analysis relying on a limited number of pieces of files and some incomplete ledgers. The accountant also acknowledged that he did not have all of the business bank records. Moreover, he did not review any of the parties' personal bank accounts or credit card statements.
The Wife's theory fails on several grounds. Initially, the accountant opines "that $13.4 million in gross profits are unaccounted for." (Ex. 80, p. 1, emphasis added.). (In the conclusion of the report he eschews the word "gross". [Ex. 80, p. 20]). He provided a limited assessment of all of the necessary costs and overhead incurred in conducting the business. Such costs included the sharing of profits with partners to each transaction as testified to by the Husband, that would have to be deducted before determining the net profit available for distribution to the Husband's business.
The report provides the bald statement: "It would be unusual for an individual to operate in a high risk activity such as diversion of goods unless there was a potential for significant
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income." (Ex. 80, p. 10). The accountant provides no basis to support this conclusion or whether this conclusion falls within the expertise of an accountant.
Furthermore, the accountant reached his conclusion of the gross profit margin for the Husband's business by comparing his business to the gross profit margins for groupings of businesses collected by The Risk Management Association. However, the businesses contained in the statistical groupings were not comparable to the husband's business. For instance, although some of the businesses in the studies sold drug sundries, some of the businesses included in the study sold pharmaceutical drugs, as well as chemicals and allied products. The Husband's business sold none of those types of products.
Even more to the point, as the accountant acknowledged, he did not provide a valuation. Rather, he merely contends that $13.4 million is unaccounted for. There is simply no evidence that these funds exist anywhere. The Wife conceded that she was unable to locate any funds in Europe or any of the entities that the Husband's companies did business with, even though she hired investigators to conduct searches.
Indeed, if anything, the evidence suggests that while the business earned profits, the parties themselves spent unreported earnings derived from the business. A review of the parties' tax returns over the years that the Husband's business flourished revealed that he regularly received a reported salary of under $90,000 and distributions that hovered around $250,000 (although in some years he received significantly less in distributions). Yet during these years, the parties purchased and, at a cost of $500,000, renovated the Marital Apartment. They purchased the Studio Apartment, as well three investment properties in Brooklyn. The children attended private schools, had tutors and attended private camp. The parties rented summer homes in the Hamptons and went on trips abroad. The Husband purchased motorcycles or parts and they each purchased jewelry. The Wife conceded that she took unreported salary for herself in the amount of approximately $100,000 each year. Furthermore, the Wife conceded that the business regularly paid many of the parties' personal expenses.1
It is more than a little curious that most of the business records do not exist. The Wife seeks to blame the Husband for this fact, but the evidence established that the Wife had as much, if not more, control of the records. She concedes that she regularly used the Studio Apartment where the business records were located, while the Husband stopped going to that apartment in 2005. The Wife began to seriously confer with divorce attorneys in 2004. She gave no evidence regarding the state of the records at that time or why she did not secure the records then. Furthermore, the Wife had access to the business bank accounts and signed wire transmissions. She had at least as much, if not more, access and opportunity to hide business funds as did the Husband.
For all of these reasons, the court concludes that the Wife failed to prove that the Husband dissipated or hid marital assets derived from his business.
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Bambu
Bambu existed long before the parties married. Originally, the Husband's father and his two siblings were the primary owners, but other family members and non-family members were shareholders (including Bambu's attorney, accountant and at least one employee of the family's other business). Over time, the Husband's parents acquired the shares held by other family members. According to the Husband's mother, these transfers were not recorded. She further testified that the company was run for a time by her son-in-law. He died in 1993 and she testified that some of Bambu's records were discarded at that time.
Although the business brings in a good income for the family now, in the 1980s and 1990s, the company was embroiled in several litigations resulting in Bambu or the Husband's mother having to pay significant sums of money to third parties. Ultimately, by buying out the other shareholders, and making the necessary legal payouts, the company stabilized. However, this process did not begin to resolve until 1997 after the Husband's uncle was bought out and litigation to dissolve Bambu was settled.2
The Husband's mother credibly testified that Bambu largely runs itself. She and her sister manage the day-to-day operation of the business. There is one manufacturer of the rolling paper, a company located in Spain. The paper is delivered to a warehouse near Newark airport. It is shipped to distributors who have worked with the company for many years. The mother testified that she sits by the phone and takes orders. Her sister writes the checks needed to pay for product or salaries and distributions. The mother signs all checks.
Both she and the Husband testified that although he is an employee of Bambu, he does no work for the company. He receives a salary so that the company can provide him health insurance. There is evidence that he attended one shareholders meeting in 1995, and that the mother may discuss the business with her children, but both the mother and Husband testified that the mother makes all business decisions. The only change in the business product was a recent effort to sell some clothing (e.g. tee-shirts) with the company logo. No credible evidence contradicted their testimony.
The Husband's Ownership Interest in Bambu
The Husband acquired Bambu shares at three different points of time during the marriage. Most recently, the Husband's mother transferred to him shares equivalent to an 8.011 percent interest in Bambu in January 2005. The mother transferred the same number of shares to her other children at that time and the gift is reflected in tax returns. The Wife concedes that these shares are the Husband's separate property.
1991 Transfer of 7.194 percent Interest in Bambu
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In 1991, the mother transferred to the Husband shares equivalent to a 7.194 percent interest in Bambu. The Husband asserts that these shares are his separate property having been gifted to him by his mother. The mother testified that her husband had, before his death, given the same percentage of shares to each of the couple's two daughters. She stated that her husband believed that the daughters and mother would need income derived from the business, whereas the son was able to work and earn his own income. After her husband's death in 1989, the mother believed she had enough money to meet her own needs and wanted to equalize the number of shares each of her children owned. Accordingly, she transferred the same number of shares to the Husband in 1991 as had previously been given to his siblings. The mother claims there are no documents reflecting this transfer because the company is a small family business, they never issued stock certificates, and many early documents of the business were not preserved.
The Wife countered that not only are there no corporate documents to reflect the transfer, but the transfer is not reflected on any tax returns. She contends that the shares were given to the Husband to prevent him from going into competition with Bambu. After the Husband was fired from his family's business in 1985, he was able to buy a supply of Bambu cigarette paper from a former manufacturer of the paper in Spain. The Husband then sought to sell the paper. To avoid the potential harm to Bambu, the corporation bought the paper from the Husband in 1991 and, in return paid him cash and transferred the Bambu shares to him. It is her contention that these shares are marital property.
The Husband concedes that in 1987 he entered into an agreement to buy cigarette paper from a manufacturer in Spain who had previously produced paper for Bambu. The terms of the agreement specifically precluded sale of the product in places where Bambu held a trademark (Ex. 7). In 1987 and 1988 he filed to register the Bambu trademark for his own company in countries where the trademark had not been registered by Bambu. In 1987, his partner at the time, John Lawrence, made a two week trip to the Carribean and Central America to try to sell the product and was able to sell a small quantity of rolling paper in Barbados (Ex. 90). However, the Husband ultimately concluded that there was no market for the product in these areas and that his fledgling business could not afford to expend more money trying to sell the product or the cost of warehousing the paper. Finally, in 1991, he entered into an agreement to sell the remaining product he possessed to Bambu in return for $46,035. The payment for the product was made on behalf of Bambu by the Husband's mother and brother-in-law as reflected in a letter agreement, dated December 31, 1991. There is no mention in that letter of any transfer of stock (Ex. 86).
The court rejects the Wife's position and, from the credible evidence, concludes that these shares are the Husband's separate property. There is no evidence to support the Wife's contention that the shares were transferred to the Husband as part of the payment for the rolling paper he possessed. In the first instance, the Husband did not attempt to compete with Bambu. He did not try to infringe on Bambu's business by endeavoring to sell the product in areas where Bambu held a trademark. The Wife presented no evidence that in 1987 and 1988 when the Husband sought to register trademarks in other countries or actually sold the product that Bambu took any action. Surely if Bambu was concerned about protecting its trademark, it would have acted much sooner to come to an accommodation with the Husband to halt his activities. Indeed, as the Wife's own expert found, Bambu carefully monitors and pursues potential infringements
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on its trademark (Ex. 93, Main Report, pp. 10-11) Yet it wasn't until four years after the Husband began trying to sell his product that an agreement was reached whereby Bambu purchased the rolling paper from the Husband. Given that time lag, it is more credible to believe the Husband's testimony that Bambu's purchase of his rolling paper stock merely helped him out of a bad business decision. There was no evidence presented that the Husband endeavored to sell the paper at the behest of Bambu.
The court recognizes the heavy burden that a spouse faces in establishing that an asset acquired during the marriage is separate property, Price v. Price, 69 N.Y.2d 8, 15 (1986); Davis v. Davis, 128 A.D.2d 470 (1st Dept1987); Fields v. Fields, __ N.Y.3d __, 2010 NY Slip Op 04871 (2010); and concludes that the Husband met his burden. The court finds that his mother testified credibly to the events resulting in the transfer of shares to the Husband and that there is no basis to believe the transfer was in any way connected to the Husband's sale of the rolling paper to Bambu. Given how this company operates, the lack of documentation to support the transfer does not defeat the Husband's claim that these shares are his separate property
1994 Purchase of the 2.641 percent interest in Bambu owned by Joseph Cutuli
Joseph Cutuli was a longtime employee of Interstate Cigar, handling transportation and distribution of product for that entity. For his services, he received 4.826 shares of common stock in Bambu. In 1994 he was approached by Alan Sills, an attorney representing the Husband's mother, to see if he wanted to sell his shares. Cutuli was anxious to do so. On October 28, 1994, he entered into an agreement with the Husband and his two sisters to sell the shares to them. (Ex. 87). Both Cutuli and the mother testified that the mother paid for the stock, but no documentary evidence was offered to support this claim.
The Husband argues that these shares are his separate property in light of the fact that his mother actually paid for them. The court rejects this argument. There is no evidence that this stock was acquired by the Husband as a gift from his mother. The only written document involving this sale indicates that the shares were purchased from Cutuli by the Husband and his sisters. The fact that the mother may have paid for the shares does not require a finding that the shares were a gift from her to her children. In light of the strong policy in finding property acquired during the marriage to be marital property, the Husband must meet his burden to establish that a claimed asset is separate property. The court finds that the shares owned by the Husband derived from the Cutuli purchase are marital property. Fields, supra.3
Appreciation of the Husband's Separate Property Bambu Ownership Interest
To the extent that the court finds that any of the Husband's ownership interest is separate property, the Wife contends she is entitled to a distribution of the appreciation in value of the Husband's separate property interest in Bambu. As set forth above, the court finds that the shares received by the Husband in 1991 and 2005 are the Husband's separate property.
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The determination that the value of appreciation of separate property may constitute marital property was articulated in the seminal case Price v. Price, 69 NY2d 8 (1986). The Court of Appeals held that "Where separate property of one spouse has appreciated during the marriage…and where such appreciation was 'due in part' to the contributions or efforts of the nontitled spouse as parent and homemaker, the amount of that appreciation should be added to the sum of marital property for equitable distribution (§236 [B] [5]). Whether assistance of a nontitled spouse, when indirect, can be said to have contributed 'in part' to the appreciation of an asset depends primarily upon the nature of the asset and whether its appreciation was due in some measure to the time and efforts of the titled spouse." Price v. Price, 69 NY2d at17-8.
Nine years later, the Court elaborated on this holding in Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NY2d 36 (1995). Mr. Hartog, was the titled spouse of separate property family businesses. He was minimally involved in the operation of two companies. He urged the Court to find that unless the Wife could show a definitive and direct nexus between his activities and the appreciation in value of those businesses, any appreciation in value should be deemed to have accrued passively and not subject to equitable distribution. The Court disagreed and placed a lesser burden on the Wife "When a nontitled spouse's claim to appreciation in the other spouse's separate property is predicated solely on the nontitled spouse's indirect contributions, some nexus between the titled spouse's active efforts and the appreciation in the separate property is required." 85 NY2d at 46.
Mr. Hartog, in addition to being a shareholder, was a director and officer of the business, attended board of director meetings, discussed and conferred on business matters, signed checks on occasion, was a salaried employee and participated in the business profit-sharing plans. Although his participation was infrequent, these roles were sufficient to find that he was actively involved in the business and had a management role. "Through the husband's attendance at Board meetings and business discussions with family members, particularly during times of crisis, a reasonable finder of fact could determine that this active involvement contributed to the appreciated value of the businesses." 85 NY2d at 49.
This court finds that the Husband here does not have the same relationship with Bambu as Mr. Hartog was found to have with his family's business. The Husband was never an officer of the corporation. Although there is evidence that he attended one shareholders' meeting in 1995, there is no evidence that he attended any meetings of the Board of Directors. There was no evidence that he participated meaningfully in any business discussions. He does not sign checks for the company and there is no evidence that he participates in deciding the amount of distribution given to shareholders each year. The Wife's expert reported on the significant number of litigations confronted by Bambu in the 1980s and 1990s. Yet, other than innuendo raised by the Wife, there is no evidence that the Husband played any role in these matters.
The Wife argues that since the Husband received a salary from Bambu, he performed some service for the company. She relies on one response by the Husband's mother during her deposition when she said that the Husband worked for Bambu. However, at trial, the mother elaborated that since the Husband receives a salary she felt compelled to say he did something, even though he does not, to justify his receiving income and health insurance benefits. At most, it appears that on occasion the mother discusses her business plans with each of her children during informal discussions, but she and the Husband credibly testified that any business
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decision was always made by the mother. For all of these reasons, the court concludes that the Wife failed to meet her burden that she is entitled to a portion of any appreciation in the value of the Husband's separate property interest in Bambu. Golub v. Ganz, 22 AD3d 919 (3d Dept 2005); Lawson v. Lawson, 28 AD2d 795 (3d Dept 2001)
The court further notes that the Wife failed to provide convincing evidence regarding the amount of the appreciation in value of Bambu. The Wife presented the testimony of a forensic accountant who conducted a series of valuations based on the different dates of the Husband's acquisition of shares and different valuation dates depending on whether the asset was considered marital or separate property. The court finds his conclusions sufficiently biased to the Wife's benefit that they lack reliability.
The court will highlight only a few problems with the valuation. In determining a base net free cash flow figure for the 2007 or 2009 valuation dates, the expert did not take an average of the past three years of the company's financial picture but used only the most recent year. He assumed an unrealistic perpetual growth rate for Bambu and concluded an increase in the growth rate from 2007 to 2009 based on the introduction by the company of a clothing line. However, he acknowledged that the only information he had regarding the clothing line came from a newspaper article and not from financial documents. In addition, he failed to adequately account for the specific risk factors attendant to this company.4
Accordingly, the court finds that the even if the Wife had proven she was entitled to a portion of the appreciation of the Husband's separate property, she failed to meet her burden in proving the value of the appreciation of the separate property. Davis v. Davis, 128 AD2d 470 (1st Dept 1987).
Real Estate
The Marital Apartment
Pursuant to a stipulation entered into by the parties on October 16, 2007, the Marital Apartment was sold and the net proceeds ($3,168,400) distributed 50 percent to each party, except that the Wife deducted $50,000 from the Husband's share due to damages claimed by the buyers to have been done to the apartment. The Wife contended that, of the parties, the Husband last resided in the apartment. However, the daughter also resided in the apartment immediately prior to the sale. The buyers demanded $100,000 which the Wife negotiated down to $50,000. The Husband did not attend the closing. The Wife apparently did not conduct her own walk-through. The Wife seeks to hold the Husband fully responsible for the $50,000 liability. The Husband
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claims since he was never consulted, this amount should be distributed equally in accordance with the parties' stipulation. Contrary to the Wife's position, the court concludes that this $50,000 is marital property.
The Studio Apartment
Vacant Lot — 297 Van Brunt Street, Brooklyn, NY
The parties agree that these properties will be sold and the net profits distributed equally. Neither party has ascribed a value to these assets. The parties previously sold two other properties in Brooklyn and distributed the profits.
Motorcycles
Throughout the marriage, the Husband purchased, sold and exchanged motorcycles as a hobby. The evidence established that many times, the Husband purchased cycles in disrepair and then refurbished the bikes. Sometimes he purchased vehicles in good condition. The Husband testified that he frequently sold or traded bikes after he refurbished them. The trades or sales would occur at "swap" events attended by other hobbyists. No documentation exists of these trades. The Wife contends that the Husband expended almost $350,000 during the marriage for this hobby and, contrary to his claim, never sold or traded his bikes. She also testified that in 2003, the Husband wrote a list of motorcycles and parts with dollar values totaling $1,240,000. The Wife testified that she asked the Husband to prepare the list because she was concerned about the amount of money they had spent on motorcycles and wanted to know their value and location. She claims the list accurately assigns value to the motorcycles owned by the Husband at that time. (Ex. 18). The Husband testified that he prepared the list in 2001. He and the Wife were arguing over the amount of money he spent on motorcycles. He contended that the list included not only cycles he owned, but ones he would like to own.
The parties agreed to have the motorcycles possessed at the time of the commencement of the action valued by a neutral expert, Peter Gagan. Mr. Gagan is a motorcycle consultant and has been involved with motorcycles almost all of his life. He has written a book on motorcycles and is regularly consulted by auction houses and individual owners on the valuation of cycles. Mr. Gagan conducted his valuation using photographs provided by the Husband since the motorcycles were in different geographical locations. (Ex. T). He concluded that the value of the bikes from the inventory he was given was $28,975. (Ex. U). The court found Mr. Gagan to be a credible witness.
The Wife does not really take exception to the expert's valuation, but claims he was not given an accurate inventory to value. In particular, she claims that the Husband skewed the appearance of the motorcycles to cause the expert to downgrade their value. However, it does not appear that the Wife objected to the inventory provided to the expert prior to trial. Accordingly, the court accepts, Mr. Gagan's valuation with respect to the inventory he was asked to value. In addition, the parties stipulated to the value of $6,500 for one additional motorcycle (Harley Davidson Road King Classic) not included in the inventory.
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The Wife's primary objection is that she claims that much of the motorcycle collection has disappeared. Given the time and money spent on this hobby, she finds it incredible that the collection is gone. She notes that the inventory of bikes given to the expert to appraise consisted of only 25 bikes whereas the Husband testified that he owned as many as 58 bikes at one time. She further notes that one of the bikes was so unique it was featured on a United States postage stamp and that it is inconceivable that the Husband parted with that cycle. The Husband does not dispute the claim that he expended significant funds during the marriage on his hobby, but counters that he never possessed the collection the Wife asserts he had. In any event, the Wife's claim regarding the number and condition of the cycles goes back to at least 2003, four years before this action began. The Husband concedes that after the commencement of this action he gave 4 motorcycles, including the bike pictured on the stamp, to his former business partner, Daniel Akerib, to repay, in part, a purported outstanding loan in the amount of $200,000 extended to the Husband at the time the parties bought their marital residence in 1994. The Husband claimed that the bikes repaid $100,000 of that loan. The Husband offered no documentary evidence of that loan. Mr. Akerib, who had been on the Husband's witness list, was never called to testify. The Husband testified that the only other bikes he still possessed were the ones in the inventory, or stipulated to as marital or separate property and that any other bikes he once possessed he had swapped or traded prior to the commencement of this action.
There is no evidence that he possessed any other bikes at the commencement of the action as claimed by the Wife. Moreover, when shown Ex.18, on which the Wife so strongly relies, Mr. Gagan found the listed prices for the bikes "generous."
The court cannot place a value on assets no longer in existence and cannot conclude that the Husband dissipated these assets. See, Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman, 12 N.Y.3d 415 (2009). However, the court will add back to the marital property $100,000 for the motorcycles given to Mr. Akerib. Thus, the court finds the value of the motorcycle collection to be $135,475 and that this value is martial property.
Jewelry
There is a quantity of jewelry being held in a safe deposit box. Neither side had the jewelry appraised. This court initially issued an Order during trial (October 30, 2009) requiring the parties to sell the jewelry. That Order was held in abeyance in a subsequent Order dated April 20, 2010. Neither side presented sufficient evidence to establish that any jewelry is separate property. Accordingly, all jewelry held in the safe deposit box is martial property.
Brokerage Accounts/Securities
The parties agree that the following account is marital property and agree to its value:
Citibank…6218 $267,237
The parties agree on the value of the following accounts:
Citibank…0723 $530,479
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Citibank Annuities $582,939
The Husband contends that these two assets are 100 percent marital property. The Wife argues that she is entitled to separate property claims against these two assets.
The Wife testified that during the marriage she inherited money from her mother. Her mother died in March 2003. The Wife claimed that her mother told her to withdraw funds from the mother's bank accounts prior to her death. The Wife points to two deposits she made in December 2002 and January 2003 totaling $88,000. The Wife claims that she withdrew these funds from her mother's account. In addition, she also claims she received $390,763 from the estate after her mother passed away. It is the Wife's contention that these funds constitute her separate property. The Husband counters that to the extent the Wife received money from her mother, the funds were co-mingled with the parties' other property and have been transmuted into marital property. It is well-established that where separate assets are co-mingled with marital assets the separate property becomes transmuted into marital property. See, Popowich v. Korman, 73 A.D.3d 515 (1st Dept 2010); Wiener v. Wiener, 57 A.D.3d 241, 244 (1st Dept 2008); Glazer v. Glazer, 190 A.D.22d 951, 953 (3d Dept 1993).
The court finds insufficient evidence presented to support the Wife's contention that she
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received $88,000 from her mother. The Wife presented no evidence of withdrawals from her mother's account to match the deposits the Wife made into her own account.
However, the court finds that the Wife presented sufficient evidence to support her claim that she inherited $390,763 from her mother. She recalled the exact amount from her review of the mother's estate tax return. The Wife claims she deposited this amount into her separate checking account and used $268,882 of these funds to purchase an annuity. She also claimed that she loaned Betlar $100,000 and presented a check on her account for this amount. The court finds insufficient evidence to support the Wife's claim that she used her separate property to loan money to Betlar, especially given that the parties seemed to use the business and personal bank accounts interchangeably for personal expenses. However, the court is satisfied that the Wife has proven that she inherited and traced $268,882 and will accord her this claim of separate property. Pullman v. Pullman, 176 A.D.2d 113, 114 (1st Dept 1991).
Thus, the Wife is entitled to $268,882 as a separate property credit against these assets.
Bank Accounts
The parties agree that the following accounts are marital property and further agree to the vlaue of these accounts:
Citibank…8727 $36,162
Citibank Betlar…0693 $211,156
Wife's Citibank…7702 $60,791
Wife's Citibank Savings…1117 $49,946
Metlife shares
The parties agree that the 1,365 Metlife shares owned in the Husband's name are marital property. By stipulation, dated October 20, 2009, the parties agreed that the value of these shares as of the date of trial was $53,016. (Ex. KK). However, the stipulation left for trial the manner in which these assets would be distributed
Life Insurance
The parties agree that the following life insurance policies are marital property and agree to the cash value of these polices:
Met Life…060A $85,159 (Death benefit: $573,817)
Met Life…055A $229,121 (Death Benefit: $1,712,451)
New York Life…642 $237,858 (Death Benefit: $953,306)
Retirement Accounts
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The parties agree that the following retirement accounts are marital property and agree to the value of these accounts:
Wells Fargo IRA…2377 $7,225
Citibank ITE Profit Sharing Plan $25,681
Automobiles
The parties agree that the following vehicles are marital property and agree to their value:
1983 Mercedes Benz de minimis
2004 Mercedes Benz CLK $18,575
2005 GMC Denali $15,000
Other Property
The Husband argues that after the commencement of this action, the Wife purchased approximately $200,000 of beauty products and home supplies. He contends that she is stockpiling these products with a view to going into business to sell them. He contends that he should receive a credit against these expended funds.
The court rejects the Husband's argument and denies his claim. During this period of time, the Wife cleared out the Studio Apartment, the daughter moved into that apartment and the Wife moved into her own rental apartment. Expenditures were necessary to accomplish these purposes and were not, when taken as a whole, unreasonable. Moreover, as the Wife's attorney correctly notes, if the Wife intended to go into business, it is hard to imagine she would make the purchases from retail stores.
The Husband's HSBC Bank Accounts
The parties agree that the money deposited in the following accounts contain a portion of the Husband's share of the proceeds of the sale of the Marital Apartment and are his separate properties:
HSBC…752-8 $361,834
HSBC…442-5 $463,468
Rock Ridge Holdings LP
Each party was to use his or her share of the proceeds from the sale of the Marital Apartment to purchase a new residence for themselves, but apparently neither party did so. The Husband, instead used some of his share to invest in an entity called Rock Ridge Holdings L.P. This was a post-commencement investment. The Husband claims to have lost money. The Wife
*16
seeks no portion of this investment. The Husband bears the consequences of his loss. The amount of the Husband's holding in this asset as of the date of trial is $844,179
Security Deposit
The Husband rented an apartment post-commencement and posted a $12,000 security deposit. The Wife seeks no claim to this money. It is the Husband's separate property. (Ex. KK).
Akerib Loan
The Husband claims he borrowed money from his business associate, Daniel Akerib, at the time the parties purchased the Marital Residence, and that at the time of commencement of this action, $200,000 remained outstanding. He offered no documentary evidence of the existence of that loan or why it remained outstanding for all of these years. The court finds the loan does not exist or, if it does, the Husband is solely responsible for its repayment.
Statutory Factors
Marital property must be distributed equitably upon consideration of the circumstances of the case and the respective parties. DRL §236 (B) (5) (c). The court has considered each of the factors set forth in DRL §236 (B) (5) (d) to the extent applicable in reaching its decision.
This was a long term marriage. The parties are in their mid to late fifties. The Husband testified to be suffering from some medical issues, including diabetes (although no medical records were presented to substantiate his claims). The Wife appears to be in good health. It is unlikely that either party can achieve the same earning capacity they each previously enjoyed. At the time this action commenced, neither party was working, although the Husband received distributions and a salary from Bambu. The Husband suggested that the Wife may be receiving some income from the sale of cosmetics, but there was no evidence to support this claim. DRL §§236 (B) (5) (d) (1), (2) and (8)
The children of the marriage are emancipated. As a result, there is no need for one parent to occupy the marital residence and, in fact, the parties have already sold it and largely distributed the proceeds of the sale. DRL §236 (B) (5) (d) (3).
The retirement funds that exist are available for distribution. However, it is worth noting that the Husband will leave the marriage with a substantial separate property interest in Bambu. The Wife will lose any potential inheritance right she may have had to that asset. However, she will receive as her separate property money derived from the inheritance from her mother's estate. DRL §236 (B) (5) (d) (4)
Both parties agree that the Wife should receive an award of maintenance. They disagree on the amount and duration of that award. The court has considered its award of maintenance (see below) in fashioning the distribution of the marital property. DRL §236 (B) (5) (d) (5).
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Both parties fully contributed to the marriage. They worked effectively as partners in the Husband's business and contributed to its years of success. The Wife played the primary role in caring for the children of the marriage when they were young. Both parties participated in household responsibilities — the Wife took care of the family's finances; the Husband shopped for groceries and, on occasion, cooked. Each party has an equitable claim to the property acquired during the marriage. The Wife contributed to the acquisition of the martial property by her work for the husband's business and as homemaker; the Husband contributed as the primary wage earner and his help around the home in meeting the family's needs. DRL §236 (B) (d) (5) (6)
Most of the marital property is liquid, subject to division, or can be sold. To the extent that marital property, in particular the interest in Bambu, has not been valued, distribution is still possible. There has been no evidence presented that any property needs to be held intact. DRL §§236 (B) (d) (5) (8) and (9).
There is no evidence of any tax consequences to either party that needs to be considered. DRL §236 (B) (d) (5) (10).
The Wife claimed that the Husband hid business assets. The court finds there was insufficient evidence to support her contention. Similarly, the Husband contends that the Wife dissipated assets. The court concludes that although the Wife concedes taking unreported income from the business, the Husband was in a position to know of the money she expended. Moreover, it appears that she used at least some of the money for family expenses. There is insufficient evidence that she otherwise hid or dissipated assets. DRL §§236 (B) (d) (5) (11) and (12).
There is no other factor the court need consider. DRL §236 (B) (d) (5) (13).
Distribution
Upon consideration of these statutory factors, the court distributes the marital property as follows:
The parties will sell and each receive 50 percent of the net profit from the sale of the Studio Apartment and the lot located at 297 Van Brundt Street, Brooklyn, NY.
As set forth above, the $50,000 the Wife withheld from the sale of the marital property as the cost necessary to pay the buyers of the Marital Apartment is marital property. The court finds that both parties poorly handled the sale of the Marital Apartment. The Husband, as the last resident, was responsible for making sure the apartment was clean. However, nothing prevented the Wife from making sure the apartment was in good order prior to the closing. Moreover, her decision to reduce the sales price of the apartment by $50,000 without her own inspection of the property was unwarranted. Accordingly, the court finds that each party is responsible for $25,000 of this cost. The Husband is entitled to a $25,000 credit from other assets.
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The motorcycle collection is valued at $135,475. The Husband will keep the motorcycles and the Wife will receive $67,737.50, less $25,000 from the closing cost set forth above, for a total of $42,737.50 from other assets.
The Citibank Annuities are marital property valued at $582,939. However, the Wife is entitled to a credit for her separate property inheritance in the amount of $268,82. She is also entitled to $42,737.50 for the value of the motorcycles. Accordingly, the Wife will receive $447,279.25 and the Husband shall receive $135,659.75 of this asset. The parties shall cooperate in completing any paperwork necessary to effect this distribution. The court notes that assets need not be distributed equally. Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 N.Y.2d 1033, 1034 (1985); Naimollah v. DeUgarte, 18 A.D.3d 268 (1st Dep't 2005). In awarding this distribution, the court has considered the Husband's separate property ownership in Bambu that will provide him significant income going forward. Moreover, awarding the Wife a greater portion of the annuities will be a factor the court will consider in awarding maintenance.
The following accounts will be distributed 50 percent to each party:
Citibank…6218 $267,237
Citibank…0723 $530,479
Citibank…8727 $ 36,162
Citibank Betlar…0693 $211,156
Wife's Citibank…7702 $ 60,791
Wife's Citibank Savings…1117 $ 49,946
Total $1,155,771
Accordingly, from these accounts the parties will each receive $577,885.50
The Husband's 2.641 percent interest in Bambu derived from his purchase of shares from Joseph Cutuli is marital property. Each party shall receive 50 percent of this asset. For the reasons previously stated, the court finds there was inadequate proof as to the value of these shares. Thus, each party shall receive a 1.3205 percent interest in Bambu. Contrary to the Husband's claim, there was no evidence that these shares are held in trust and therefore, no impediment exists to this distribution being made. The Husband shall cause appropriate documentation to be issued to the Wife to record her interest in this asset and to ensure her receipt of distributions made by Bambu.
The parties own 1,365 shares of MetLife. At the time of trial, these shares had a value of $53,016. However, in light of market fluctuations, the court finds it appropriate to distribute 50 percent of the shares in kind to each party.
The cash value of the following life insurance policies shall be distributed 50 percent to each party.
Met Life…060A $85,159
Met Life…055A $229,121
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Total $314,280
Accordingly, from these policies, each party will receive $157,140.
A third life insurance policy, New York Life…643, with a cash value of $237,858 and a death benefit of $953,306, shall be maintained by the Husband to protect the award of maintenance. DRL §236B (8) (a). The Wife shall be named the beneficiary. When the Husband reaches the age of 75 he shall have the right to cash in this policy or change the beneficiary. The Husband will then pay the Wife $168,929 representing 50 percent of the cash value of the policy at the time of trial. If the Husband elects to maintain the policy for the benefit of the Wife, he will not owe her this cash value. In the alternative, the parties can agree to redeem this policy immediately and each receive 50 percent of its cash value. If the parties reach this agreement, no insurance will be required to protect the maintenance award.
The value of the retirement accounts are:
Wells Fargo IRA…2377 $ 7,225
Citibank ITE Profit Sharing Plan $25,681
Total $32,906
The automobiles owned by the parties have a total value of $33,575. The Husband shall retain the cars and shall transfer 100 percent of the retirement accounts to the Wife.
The jewelry held in the safe deposit box shall be sold and each party shall receive 50 percent of the proceeds. The jewelry will be sold by an agreed upon agent within 90 days of this decision.
Maintenance
The court may award maintenance where justice requires, having regard for the standard of living established during the marriage, the lack of sufficient income and property to provide for the reasonable needs of the recipient, and the ability to pay by the other party, as well as the circumstances of the case and the respective parties. DRL §236 (B) (6) (a). This court has considered each of the factors set forth in DRL §236 (B) (6) (a) to the extent applicable in reaching its findings.
The Wife will receive distributions in cash of over $1,000,000. Some of the distribution includes annuities. She will also receive 50 percent of the marital assets that still need to be sold, including real estate and jewelry. She received $1,788,000 from the sale of the Marital Apartment. She will also receive distributions from her percentage ownership in Bambu. Although the court does not have evidence of the actual value of some of the assets to be distributed, it is reasonable to assume that the Wife will have received well over $3,000,000. Based on past performance, it appears that the Husband will continue to receive distributions and salary from Bambu. The court recognizes that the Husband's ownership interest in Bambu, as well as any appreciation in the value of his interest, has been found to be largely his separate property. DRL §236 (B) (6) (a) (1).
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As previously noted, this was a long-term marriage. The parties are in their mid to late fifties. The Husband testified that he suffers from diabetes. The Wife is in good health. DRL §236 (B) (6) (a) (2). The children of the marriage are grown and need no parental care. DRL §236 (B) (6) (a) (6). The Wife did not delay developing an earning capacity as the result of having foregone employment to care for the children. The Wife worked for the Husband's business after the youngest child began to attend school. The Wife made significant contributions to the marriage and her Husband's career, both as the primary homemaker and as an employee of the Husband's business. However, it is unclear that the Wife's work experience enables her to find significant employment in today's job market. Each party presented expert testimony regarding the Wife's present earning capacity. The Husband's employment expert testified that in his opinion the Wife could market herself as a sales representative and could eventually earn approximately $80,000. The Wife's employment expert testified that she could earn in the range of $25-35,000. Although it does not appear that the Husband will likely work again, he will receive significant distributions and salary from Bambu. In 2009 he received salary and distribution from Bambu of approximately $1,000,000. DRL §§236 (B) (6) (a) (3), (4),(5) and (8).
Notwithstanding the parties' contentions, the court finds no evidence exists to support a conclusion that either party dissipated marital property. Rather, the court finds that the parties regularly paid for personal expenses from business accounts. It also appears that each party on occasion used marital funds for his or her own purposes and, perhaps, against the other parties' interest. The Husband spent significant money on motorcycles. The Wife, without the Husband's consent, may have used a greater share of the proceeds of the sale of Brooklyn properties previously owned by both parties for her own purposes. The court does not find any of these expenditures to constitute wasteful dissipation. Similarly, there is no evidence of a transfer of property in contemplation of this divorce action, except to the extent that money may have been used for attorney fees. Although each party suggested that the other hid funds or drew a greater share of marital funds for his or her own purpose, the evidence presented is not of such quality as to affect this court's maintenance decision. §§236 (B) (6) (a) (9), (10). No other statutory factor warrants consideration.
From all of these factors, the court concludes that an award of maintenance is appropriate. The parties lived an above-average lifestyle and enjoyed certain luxury items. However, it was not an extravagant lifestyle. The evidence revealed that the Husband receives substantial remuneration from Bambu, sufficient to enable both parties to enjoy a comfortable lifestyle. Although it is conceivable that the Wife could obtain employment, neither expert suggested that she could ever earn sufficient income to match the marital lifestyle. Moreover, given her age, it is questionable if she could develop a career that would make her truly self supporting. It is ironic that while the Husband claims he need not work (although he never provided medical documentation to support his claim), he contends that the Wife is capable of working. However, the Wife will receive significant assets from the distribution of the marital property, including most of the parties' annuities and retirement accounts. By granting the Wife maintenance, her assets will be able to grow, providing her greater financial security as she ages.
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The court has reviewed the Wife's most recent net worth statement (Ex. 41) and has considered her testimony regarding her expenses. Certain of the expenses will no longer exist after the distribution of the parties' assets (e.g. the costs for the Studio Apartment). Moreover, the Wife conceded that she had been paying some of their daughter's expenses. That either parent may want to assist a grown child is admirable, but not the proper subject of a maintenance award.
In light of all of these factors, the court awards the Wife $14,000 a month in maintenance, taxable to the Wife and deductible to the Husband. This award shall be in effect from September 1, 2010 until August 31, 2013. Effective September 1, 2013, and until August 31, 2018, the Husband shall pay to the Wife maintenance in the amount $10,000 a month, taxable to the Wife, deductible to the Husband. Thereafter, the Husband shall pay permanent maintenance of $5,000 a month, taxable to the Wife, deductible to the Husband. This award shall terminate in accordance with the provisions of DRL §236 (B) (6) (c).
The Pendente Lite Maintenance Awards, Arrears, Security for Future Maintenance Payments
The parties engaged in extensive pre-trial litigation regarding the parties' assets and support for the Wife. Initially, it was agreed that the Husband would deposit a certain amount of money into the parties' joint bank account from which the Wife would draw money for her own needs and payment due on certain of the parties' assets. By order dated April 16, 2008, Justice Joan Lobis, then presiding over this case, directed the Husband to deposit $405,024 from funds distributed to him by Bambu into the parties' joint bank account and allowed the Wife to draw $200,000 from those funds for her own use. Judge Lobis further ordered at that time that if the Husband failed to deposit the requisite funds, the Husband would be required to pay $18,000 a month in tax-free pendente lite maintenance, retroactive to September 25, 2007.
The Husband did not deposit the $405,024, but instead tendered a check to the Wife in the amount of $112,000 with the explanation that the sum reflected the Wife's share of distributions paid to the Husband by Bambu, less taxes he needed to pay in connection with those distributions. Over the Wife's objection, the Husband deposited the $112,000 into the Wife's checking account.
The case was transferred to Justice Jacqueline Silbermann. In Motion Sequence 10, the Wife sought to invoke the default provision of Judge Lobis' Order requiring the Husband to pay $18,000 per month as tax free interim maintenance, plus $5,000 per month in retroactive arrears for his failure to deposit the full $405,024 in the parties' joint bank account. Judge Silbermann granted the Wife's application, but ordered that the maintenance would be retroactive only to May 1, 2008, two weeks after the date of Judge Lobis' order. Judge Silbermann based her decision, in part, on the fact that the Wife had received $112,000. Moreover, the Husband had paid taxes on the Bambu distribution. (Ex. 71)
The Wife now contends that she is entitled to arrears of the pendente lite support. The Husband did not owe the taxes in 2007 that he claimed he had to pay on the Bambu distribution. The Wife argues that she should receive $88,000 in accordance with the Husband's obligation to deposit the full amount of his Bambu distribution of $405,024 of which the Wife should have received $200,000 but only received $112,000.
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The Wife's application is denied. Judge Silbermann's award to the Wife of retroactive maintenance addressed the arrears owed to the Wife. The Husband was ordered to pay maintenance retroactive to the Wife to May 1, 2007. In light of the fact that the Wife had already received $112,000, Judge Silbermann did not need to address arrears before that date. In effect, the $112,000 became the $18,000 a month the Wife would have received retroactive to the date she brought her first pendente lite application.
Although the Husband had been late in meeting some of his temporary support payments, and the court finds some of the Husband's reasons for late payment without basis, as of the trial maintenance payments were up-to-date. At this time the court sees no basis to require security for the payment of the maintenance award going forward.
The Husband's application for credit for his claimed overpayment of pendente lite support is denied. Some of the Wife's expenses during the pendency of this action went to maintain joint assets (e.g., the Studio Apartment). Although the Husband complains that this asset should have been sold, the court notes that the Wife cooperated in the sale of the Marital Apartment which might not have been ordered to be sold pendente lite. As this action proceeded, the parties' daughter resided in the Studio Apartment. The Husband complained that he should not have had to bear the daughter's rental costs. However, the Husband conceded during trial that he also paid certain of the adult children's expenses. The court finds no purpose would be served in trying to parse the various expenses paid by the Wife and concludes that the award of pendente lite maintenance was appropriate. Moreover, the award of maintenance by this decision reduces the Husband's ongoing obligation.
The Wife's application for necessaries is denied. The court finds no evidence that the Wife owes money because she did not receive support. Even if she had to use savings to meet her expenses pending payments made by the Husband, he ultimately paid the support owed. As the Wife concedes, certain of her expenses were for the daughter's support for which an award of necessaries would be unwarranted. Moreover, certain of the Wife's expenditures, in particular the charges on her credit card, would not fall within the realm of "necessaries." The court is satisfied that the pendente lite award covered her costs and an award of necessaries is unwarranted. The court, therefore, need not consider the Husband's procedural arguments.
Attorney Fees
The Wife seeks attorney fees in the total amount of $582,084 and expert fees in the total amount of $266,804.04
The decision to award counsel and expert fees is left to the sound discretion of the court. Indigence is not a requirement. DeCabrera v. DeCabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 (1987). "The issue of such is controlled by the equities and circumstances of each particular case and the Court must consider the relative merits of the parties and their respective financial positions in determining whether an award is appropriate. (citations omitted)" Hackett v.Hackett, 147 AD2d 611 (2d Dept. 1989).
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The Wife seeks counsel fees for the representation she received from two different firms in this action. The Wife initially retained Steven J. Wohl of Stern Kaiser Panken & Wohl in December 2004. That firm continued to represent her until September 21, 2009, serving as co-counsel after the Wife retained Anthony J. Daniele on May 23, 2007 as litigation counsel. Mr. Wohl, in his affirmation, states Mr. Daniele consulted with him regarding negotiations, strategy and discovery. Mr. Wohl also met with the Wife periodically to discuss how the case was proceeding. The papers give no explanation as to why two firms were necessary to represent the Wife. The Wife paid Mr. Wohl in full. The court finds that the Wife is free to retain any number of attorneys, but no basis exists to require the Husband to pay for her desire to consult with multiple attorneys. The court awards no fees towards Mr. Wohl's costs.
Mr. Daniele claims the Wife was billed $529,141.13 by his firm. In his affirmation, he details the significant amount of motion practice and pre-trial efforts expended by counsel. From a review of his papers and those submitted by the Husband's counsel, the court cannot conclude, as the Wife suggests, that the Husband, any more than the Wife, caused this litigation to become unduly excessive.
Mr. Daniele acknowledges that the Wife has paid him $477,631.32 and that the Wife always paid her bills promptly. The Husband contends, and the evidence supports his position, that as part of her pre-litigation strategy, the Wife deposited marital funds into her own account. The court concludes that she used these funds to pay her attorneys and thus had the benefit of marital funds to pursue this litigation.
The court recognizes that as a result of his separate property interests, the Husband will have more assets than the Wife when this case is over. However, the court has awarded the Wife some separate property claims and a significant maintenance award. The marital property has largely been divided equally.
Taking all of these facts into account, the court awards $50,000 as attorney fees to be paid by the Husband to Mr. Daniele within 90 days of this decision and order.
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The Wife also seeks an award of $109,858.50 for the services provided by HHR, the accounting firm that conducted the evaluation pertaining to the alleged $13.4 million of business profits the Husband hid overseas. The Husband argues that the Wife aggressively pursued this claim even though she knew the claim could not be proven. Notwithstanding the Wife's control of the office and the records of the Husband's business, and her litigation planning since 2004, surprisingly few records existed for an evaluation to be done. She testified to making efforts to locate accounts overseas, but found none. Prior to retaining HHR, she retained another forensic accountant to review the existing records and then discharged him. The report prepared by HHR, concededly not a valuation, at most concluded, from a review of very limited documents, that as much as $13.4 million in gross profits were unaccounted for. The Report did not suggest that this money still existed. Inadequate consideration was given to certain costs of doing business or the parties' use of the business profits. The Wife refused to abandon her position that these funds existed even when it became evident during trial that she could not prove her position. The court finds she is solely responsible for these expert fees.
The Wife also seeks an award of $156,945.58 for the services provided by Eisner LLP for its valuation of the Husband's Bambu shares and the appreciation in value of those shares. In three separate applications before the three different judges who presided over the case, the Wife sought a neutral expert to value the Husband's Bambu interest. Each time her application was denied. The evidence available to the court strongly suggested that the Husband's interest in Bambu was his separate property (See, Ex. 71, p. 5). Although this court has awarded to the Wife a small percentage of the Bambu shares, the cost incurred by the Wife to investigate this issue are excessive. The court awards to the Wife $15,000 towards the cost she incurred.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the parties shall sell and each receive 50 percent of the net profit from the sale of the Studio Apartment and the lot located at 297 Van Brundt Street, Brooklyn, NY. The process of selling these assets shall begin forthwith; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall receive a $25,000 credit as his portion of the $50,000 Plaintiff withheld from the sale of the Marital Residence; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall retain possession of the motorcycle collection; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff shall receive $447,279.25 and Defendant shall receive $135,659.75 of the Citibank Annuities. Each party shall receive a proportionate share of any accrued interest. Plaintiff's portion of this asset reflects her 50 percent distribution plus $268,882 representing her separate property inheritance and $42,737.50 representing her portion of the value of the motorcycle collection after crediting the Defendant $25,000 derived from the sale of the Marital Residence. The parties shall cooperate in completing any paperwork necessary to effect this distribution; and it is further
ORDERED, that each party shall receive $577,885.50, plus an equal distribution of any accrued interest, derived from the following accounts: Citibank…6218; Citibank…0723; Citibank…8727; Citibank Betlar…0693; Plaintiff's Citibank…7702; Plaintiff's Citibank Savings…1117. The parties shall cooperate to complete any paperwork necessary to effect this distribution; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall cause to be transferred to the Plaintiff a 1.3205 percent interest in Bambu. Defendant shall cause appropriate documentation to be issued to the Plaintiff to record her interest in this asset and to ensure her receipt of distributions made by Bambu; and it is further
ORDERED, that each party shall receive 682.5 shares of their MetLife stock. The parties shall cooperate in completing the necessary paperwork to effect this distribution; and it is further
ORDERED, that the cash value of the following life insurance policies shall be distributed 50 percent to each party: Met Life…060A and Met Life…055A. From this distribution each party shall receive $157,140 plus any accrued cash value to be distributed 50 percent to each party. A third life insurance policy, New York Life…643, with a cash value of $237,858 and a death
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benefit of $953,306, shall be maintained by the Defendant to protect the award of maintenance. DRL §236B (8) (a). The Plaintiff shall be named the beneficiary. When the Defendant reaches the age of 75 he shall have the right to cash in this policy or change the beneficiary. If he does so, Defendant shall then pay the Plaintiff $168,929 representing 50 percent of the cash value of the policy at the time of trial. If Defendant elects to maintain the policy for the benefit of Plaintiff, he will not owe her this cash value. In the alternative, the parties can agree to redeem this policy immediately and each receive 50 percent of its cash value. If the parties reach this agreement, no insurance will be required to protect the maintenance award. The parties shall cooperate to complete any necessary documents to effectuate this Order provision; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Plaintiff shall receive 100 percent of the following retirement accounts: Wells Fargo IRA…2377 and Citibank ITE Profit Sharing Plan for a total value of $32,906. The parties shall cooperate to effectuate a transfer of these assets; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall retain possession and sole ownership of the marital property automobiles; and it is further
ORDERED, that the jewelry held in the safe deposit box shall be sold and each party shall receive 50 percent of the proceeds. The jewelry will be sold by an agreed upon agent within 90 days of this decision and order; and it is further
ORDERED, that the following assets are the Defendant's separate property: the 7.194 percent interest in Bambu he received in 1991; the 8.011 percent interest in Bambu he received in 2005; 100 percent of the funds in his HSBC…752-8 and HSBC…442-5 accounts; 100 percent of his interest in Rockridge Holdings LLP; the $12,000 security deposit for his present renal apartment; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Defendant is 100 percent liable for the Daniel Akerib loan in the amount of $200,000; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff $14,000 a month in maintenance, taxable to the Plaintiff and deductible to Defendant, effective from September 1, 2010 until August 31, 2015. Effective September 1, 2015, and until August 31, 2018, Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff maintenance in the amount $10,000 a month, taxable to the Plaintiff, deductible to Defendant. Effective September 1, 2018 Defendant shall pay permanent maintenance of $5,000 a month, taxable to the Wife, deductible to the Husband. This award shall terminate in accordance with the provisions of DRL §236 (B) (6) (c); and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff's counsel Anthony Daniele $50,000 as attorney fees on behalf of Plaintiff, said fees to be paid within 90 days of this Decision and Order without further notice; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff $15,000 for the fees she incurred in retaining Eisner LLP, said fees to be paid within 90 days of this Decision and Order; and it is further
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ORDERED, that any relief requested that is not specifically granted has been considered by the court and is hereby denied.
This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court.
1. These expenses were paid primarily through money earned from the Husband's business. The parties did not receive salary from Bambu until 1997 and it wasn't until after the Husband's business largely ceased operations that he received substantial distributions from Bambu.
2. The Wife's own expert noted: "Legal and professional fees as reflected in Bambu's tax returns for the period 2003 through 2008 have stabilized and have not exceeded $60,000 in any year during such period indicating that legal matters from the former S. entities that hampered Bambu's operating profits in earlier years have diminished." (Ex. 93, Main Report, p. 11).
3. The court finds that the Husband provided insufficient evidence to establish that these shares are held in trust. No trust documents were proffered. Thus, there is no impediment to the distribution of the shares.
4. Although found by this court to be marital property, the expert's valuation of the Cutuli shares was problematic. In determining the original acquisition price of the stock, the accountant failed to consider contemporary transactions of sale of Bambu stock, including the stock sold by Mr. Cutuli, David Fund (Bambu's lawyer) and a court-determined valuation arising from litigation in 1995. The expert placed a value on the stock received by the Husband from the Cutuli purchase at $1.1 million whereas all three of the actual transactions around that times had values of $1.8 to $1.9 million. The difference in these numbers would significantly affect the valuation.
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| August 17, 2010 |
| LA Dodgers Dealing with Divorce |
| Posted By Brian Perskin |
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High net worth divorces can be especially messy. For Frank and Jamie McCourt, many wait to see what detriment their divorce will have on their baby of six years, The Los Angeles Dodgers.
The McCourts were teenage lovebirds, married for thirty years; they flourished as partners in real estate and purchased the Dodgers together in 2004. Nevertheless, the marriage dissolved in 2008. In the midst of this bitter divorce, an outstanding question awaiting resolution is whether the Dodgers will go with Mommy McCourt or with Daddy.
The McCourt divorce demonstrates, on a larger scale and from a more public sphere, what occurs in any family dealing with divorce and the difficulties that may arise with equitable distribution. The fate of the ownership of the team now rests in the hands of the Court system. |
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| May 12, 2010 |
| The Perils of Evading the Accounting of Funds |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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SUFFOLK COUNTY Supreme Court
Justice J. Bivona
PLAINTIFF wife sought an order finding defendant husband in contempt of court for failing to comply with a summons. The summons contained automatic restraining orders, yet defendant on the same day withdrew nearly $10,000 and over $170,000 on the following day, in violation of the automatic restraining orders. Defendant argued he withdrew the funds out of economic necessity. Defense counsel contended the "automatic orders" set forth in Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(2)(b) were statutory mandates, but did not constitute court orders, arguing civil contempt under Judiciary Law §753 was inappropriate for violation of these mandates. The court agreed, finding that as the directive in the summons did not constitute a clear and unequivocal order, plaintiff's application for contempt was denied. However, the court noted defendant was also in violation of two court orders in which defendant was directed to provide an accounting of the $170,000 he withdrew from his IRA. Thus, it directed defendant to appear with a full accounting and a check for the remaining sums in defendant's account, noting if defendant failed to appear, a warrant for his arrest would be issued.
Plaintiff seeks the following relief:
a. citing defendant for his contempt of Court and imposing such fines, monetary sanctions and/or other penalties, including incarceration for failing to comply with the parties' Summons with Notice duly served on defendant on September 21, 2009;
b. ordering defendant to provide an accounting of the approximate sum of $180,000.00 from the proceeds of defendant's _________ retirement Account;
c. ordering defendant to deposit all remaining monies from the defendant's _________ retirement Account into the escrow account of _________, LLP pending further Court Order or Stipulation by the parties;
d. directing plaintiff to pay counsel fees in the sum of $1,095.00 for services in connection with the paperwork on this enforcement proceeding with leave to request additional counsel fees, if warranted.
Defendant was served with a Summons with Notice on September 21, 2009 at 4:12 p.m. Said Summons contained the automatic restraining Orders. It is undisputed that on September 21, 2009, defendant removed $9,999.99 and then withdrew the remaining balance of $170,966.99 on September 22, 2009, in violation of the automatic restraining Order literally the day after he was served with the Summons for divorce. Defendant contends that these funds were withdrawn out of economic necessity and due to his advanced Lyme disease.
Prior to adjudicating the defendant in contempt, the Court must ascertain that there was a clear and unequivocal Order, that defendant had knowledge of the Order, that defendant violated the Order and that noncompliance caused prejudice to the plaintiff in this litigation, see McCormick v. Axelrod, 59 N.Y.2d 574, 466 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1983); Rienzi v. Rienzi, 23 A.D.3d 447, 808 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2nd Dept., 2005). Counsel for defendant argues that the "automatic orders" set forth in DRL smark236(B)(2)(b) are statutory mandates and do not constitute orders issued by a Court. Therefore, civil contempt pursuant to Judiciary Law smark753 is not an appropriate remedy for violation of these statutory mandates, warranting denial of the plaintiff's application as a matter of law. This Court agrees as the directive in the Summons does not constitute a clear and unequivocal order. Accordingly, plaintiff's application for contempt is denied.
The Court notes that defendant is also now in violation of this Court's Orders dated February 16, 2010 and February 18, 2010, in which defendant was directed to provide an accounting (with back up documentation) of the approximate $170,000.00 he withdrew from his IRA by April 1, 2010 and to deposit all remaining monies from the fidelity IRA into the plaintiff's attorney's escrow account. Defendant does not dispute same. Based on the foregoing, the Court directs the defendant to appear before this Court on Monday, May 17, 2010 at 10:30 a.m. with the full accounting and a check for the remaining sums in the defendant's account as of the date of service of the Order to Show Cause dated February 18, 2010. In the event defendant fails to appear a warrant shall be issued for his arrest.
Plaintiff is granted a counsel fee award in the sum of $1,095.00 to be paid by defendant on May 17, 2010, Prichep v. Prichep, 52 A.D.3d 61, 858 N.Y.S.2d 667 (2nd Dept., 2008); Kesten v. Kesten, 234 A.D.2d 427, 650 N.Y.S.2d 807 (2nd Dept., 1996).
The foregoing constitutes the Order of this Court. ¦
It is important to hire a lawyer who stays up to date on the latest developments in the law. For further information about The Law Offices of Brian D. Perskin please click here.
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| May 12, 2010 |
| Chutzpah in Marital Jurisprudence |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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In a recent decision by Judicial Hearing Officer Stanley Gartenstein, the Court strongly considered the believability of a party's poverty claim in its award of maintenance and child support. In New York matrimonial and family law cases, it is essential to remember that Judges will examine an individual's expenses and lifestyle in determining maintenance, child support, and equitable distribution. Below find the text of the decision.
Judicial Hearing Officer Stanley Gartenstein
NASSAU COUNTY Supreme Court
Judicial Hearing Officer Gartenstein
DECISION
J 1 's efforts to beat the system represent a new zenith in chutzpah. 2
After a long and bitterly contested trial, this complex litigation may best be summed up as a well crafted but legally bankrupt claim of "sudden poverty", a disease which seems to infect matrimonial litigants with particular frequency. Apart from the time, effort and expense to which J has put his wife to penetrate the smoke screen he has so skillfully created-and we must begrudgingly give him credit for that-his schemes are a house of cards constructed by a self-indulgent individual intent upon his own gratification at the expense of all those innocent persons who have given of themselves to him and who had a right to expect more.
THE MARRIAGE
The parties ("N' and 'J") were married in 1980 in a religious ceremony. There are three children, A, born XXXX; S, born XXXX; and E, born XXXX. A is past the age of emancipation; S will reach that age in less than a half year; E has XXXXX and XXXXX traits. She has undergone surgery for XXXXX.
JURISDICTION
This action was commenced on September 26, 2005. It has tortuously wound its way through the Court and been referred to the undersigned, a Judicial Hearing Officer, who conducted the trial upon a hear and determine stipulation. The trial commenced on June 1, 2009 and concluded on October 28, 2009. Closing submissions are now complete.
CHUTZPAH/CREDIBILITY
Because the "sudden poverty" defense makes credibility the central issue in any matrimonial action, we are called upon to assess the motives of the respective parties and their incentive or lack of it to color the truth or lie outright. Our insight into J must therefore, at least to some extent, be governed by the chutzpah he has demonstrated.
It doesn't take chutzpah to cheat on one's spouse. But J didn't just cheat on N. He diverted marital income to take his girlfriend on luxury vacations which he charged to a credit card knowing that the bill would necessarily come to his home and be opened by N. He refused to give up this meretricious affair or leave the marital home even after this action was commenced, insisting instead on humiliating N by carrying it on openly and notoriously while living under the same roof with her and the children.
Nor does it take chutzpah to claim poverty while bedecking oneself in $5,300 designer jeans from Tyrone's in Roslyn Village. But J's "explanation" would have the Court believe that these designer jeans in particular were purchased solely to comply with a one day per week dress-down code allegedly prevailing in his new work environment.
It doesn't take chutzpah to devise a scenario of "sudden poverty'. But J closed down one of New York's premier stationery stores on the eve of trial, thereby putting 24 faithful employees on the unemployment lines.
Nor does it take chutzpah to steal from one's own father. But J plundered his dying father's estate as he suffered from Parkinson's disease and lacked the physical and mental capacity to "lend" the money J claims to have "borrowed". And when caught by his father's executor with his hand in the cookie jar, J brazenly advanced the interesting proposition that N of all people should shoulder part of the responsibility to make restitution.
It doesn't take chutzpah to demand custody of the children. But J litigated for custody of two estranged sons who barely speak to him and as he was about to face cross-examination, his demand mysteriously evaporated.
Nor does it take chutzpah not to get along with one's in-laws. But J hired a detective to dig up actual or imagined dirt on his 84 year old father-in-law. This at the same time he was scheming to avoid paying maintenance by claiming that N's father, the very same 84 year old father he was trying to discredit, would obtain employment for her thereby taking him "off the hook".
It doesn't take chutzpah to claim poverty while maintaining membership in the exclusive Muttontown Golf Club. But J maintained his membership first; then took a leave of absence conveniently timed for his application for downward modification; then, after its denial, reinstated himself until the eve of trial; and then conveniently "canceled" so that he could again claim poverty.
These acts raise the bar. They establish a new standard in chutzpah, even for matrimonial actions.
AS
The issues of this litigation are so intimately interwoven with J's alter-ego business entity that the Court's ultimate decision will necessarily center on its assessment of that entity's inner structure. For this reason, detailed analysis of AS, J's alter ego, must constitute a required threshold to any decision addressed to the financial equities between the parties.
AS, a thriving retail and wholesale office supply on Madison Avenue and 40th Street in New York City, was founded by defendant's grandfather. It was then owned and operated by his father, B. J, representing the third generation, worked there, effectively assuming control during years in which his father grew old. He forced his brother S out of the business on one day's notice over some personal issue. He and his sister, J, now effectively own all the assets of AS in whatever form they now exist; J's husband and J now operate what remains of AS.
In view of J's pained outcry that AS is worthless, it is interesting that, "poverty" and all, he recently purchased his brother's 16 percent share of AS for $350,000
On the eve of trial, J, claiming that AS had suffered devastating losses which mandated that he close the store, reinvented the business with an elaborate structure which basically, notwithstanding his claims to being destitute, kept his flow of income intact while showing an illusory business decline. He accomplished this by closing his Madison Avenue store, making his business an independent contractor of one of the country's largest buying offices, WLG, into whose office he physically moved. In so doing, he took advantage of the tremendous discounts generated by WLG's purchasing volume while virtually eliminating overhead expenses.
J's new corporation is known as GM, LLC. He owns 51 percent thereof. He is also the owner of 50 percent of AS and 50 percent of ABC, a separate entity created to fill customers' demand for coffee and bottled water. It is claimed that AS's only income is from a licensing agreement with GM, the net effect of which provides that GM make certain payments for the good will, name, phone number, etc. of AS.
As pointed out in plaintiff's closing argument, J had certain concerns on the eve of trial:
1. He and his sister J were liable for a line of credit with HSBC in the sum of $250,000;
2. If his new business arrangement with WLG did not succeed, he would then be compelled to resume business with his former supplier, UN, to which AS had a running remaining balance of $474,480;
3. A $205,000 shareholder's "loan" which he could "repay" by distributing to himself and his sister tax free;
4. AS's $2,428,000 loss carry forward which would allow it to write off income, to the extent of this loss.
J's incorporation of GM was immediately followed by an independent contractor's agreement on its behalf with WLG on September 25, 2008 which provided that GM would purchase supplies through WLG which offered substantial purchase discounts. The contract provided that GM and WLG would divide gross sales revenues forty (40 percent ) percent to GM and sixty (60 percent ) percent to WLG. Additionally, for the first three years, GM is paid an additional bonus by WLG equal to ten (10 percent ) percent of the gross profit. WLG assumed payment for GM's staff salaries up to $35,000 per year for each million dollars of GM's gross annual sales. The contract with WLG provides that for the first year (October 1, 2008 through September 30, 2009) this amount would be based on $5 million of sales or $175,000 of salary paid to the GM staff. Thereafter, it is to be adjusted pro rata in accordance with the actual gross sales of GM.
GM, J, J, and a small staff then physically moved in with WLG and now operate from there.
Following execution of the contract, AS then delivered a promissory note (November 12, 2008) to its former supplier UN Stationers in the aggregate sum of $474,480. By its terms, as of February, 2010 the balance due thereon is $158,160. Although not required to do so, on November 15, 2008, three days following execution of the promissory note by AS, J personally guaranteed payment of it.
This assumption of personal liabilities furthered J's scheme to preserve the valuable assets remaining in AS, including the shareholder's loans and loss carry forward as well as the ability to structure other tax and business benefits.
On September 24, 2008, AS entered into a "Licensing Agreement" with GM (both totally controlled and dominated by J wherein GM agreed to pay $26,200 per month ($314,400 per year) to AS for the use of AS's name, telephone number, website and customer list. J admitted under oath that this sum was determined solely by him and that it was based upon AS's debt. 3
D, CPA, a respected evaluator, testified that the licensing fee of $26,200 per month was obviously established to enable GM to reduce its taxable income by deducting this so-called "fee" paid to AS as a business expense. AS could then offset this income from GM against its $2,428,000 loss carry forward. This results in a double deduction for D's related companies, and enables him to manipulate the taxable income of both entities in violation of IRS Code Section 1201.
In getting from Point A to Point B, AS suddenly changed the method of preparation of its December 2008 financial statement from a "review" standard, which requires investigation and verification of all financial information provided, to a "compilation" standard for the last financial statement dated December 31 2008. This latter standard is based solely upon J's representations concerning his financial transactions. He never produced a "reviewed", much less "audited", financial statement for December, 2008, the only six month period in which AS reported a "loss". 4
D prepared an analysis of cash flow of GM and AS. In the first year of operation, GM received $508,266 in commissions, plus a bonus of $132,465. Thus, its total income for the first year of operation was $640,733. After various deductions including deducting the so-called "licensing fee" paid to AS, the resulting total cash flow was $549,933. Fifty percent of this figure, viz, $274,966 would reasonably flow as income to J for the first year of operation based upon the assumption that the UN note would be paid in full. Plaintiff urges that this is the appropriate income to be imputed to J as the basis for her claim for maintenance and child support. She asserts no claim in equitable distribution to any part of this business, whatever format is in current use. Her closing argument points out that the balance due on the UN note is $158,160. J's own filings outline his tax refunds of $248,280 received (or shortly to be received) pursuant to his filings in the Fall of 2009. Accordingly, after payment in full of J's share of the HSBC line of credit ($125,000) being held pursuant to this Court's Order), he will have available, by reason of tax refunds, an additional $113,848, a sum more than sufficient to fully satisfy his obligations to UN. This would make available to his business entity a full line of credit which has been unavailable for years.
Assuming arguendo that J continues paying the so-called "licensing fee", he will then have the wherewithal to repay himself and his sister the outstanding shareholder's loans of $205,000 tax free any time he so desires. This will reduce the tax liability of GM by having it make payments to AS which bear no proportionate relationship to AS's assets and will artificially reduce GM's income so that AS will receive tax free income by deducting it against its $2,428,000 loss carryover. All this rests in J's uncontrolled discretion. He is in effect taking money from one pocket and putting it in another. He has masterfully manipulated the shadow entities created at his direction to present an illusion of legitimacy. Thus everything which has or will happen boils down to J and only J.
In the face of J's "sudden poverty" claim that his business has been in a downward spiral first because of 9-11, second because of competition from Staples, it is appropriate to note the amounts reported as business income on his tax returns as follows:
2000 $214,960
2001 $206,052
2002 $206,967
2003 $210,475
2004 $214,310
2005 $227,864
2006 $239,476
2007 $241,388
J's companies have also consistently logged increasing gross profits in the face of his claim that business was dramatically declining. The evidence shows that reported gross profits were:
2001 32.45 percent
2002 36.25 percent
2006 35.9 percent
2007 36.13 percent
2008 33 percent
During GM's first year of operation gross profit percentages were shown to be consistent with AS's as follows:
October 2008 32 percent
November 2008 34 percent
December 2008 30 percent
January 2009 32 percent
February 2009 32 percent
March 2009 32 percent
April 2009 30 percent
May 2009 31 percent
It is also painfully clear from the evidence that virtually all personal expenses, credit cards, bills, groceries, life insurance, disability insurance, cell phone, automobile, long term care, and commutation expenses for J have been paid through these business entities in a total expenditure which dwarfs his declared earnings.
The totality of the evidence paints a picture of J's undiminished wealth and an almost obsessive single-mindedness on his part to do N, his long-term wife and mother of his children, out of her just entitlement. His testimony, obviously contrived for the trial, was pedantic, often condescending. J made sure to lecture the Court about how his elderly father-in-law, as he tells it, the source of all his problems, ruined his life in some vague and unspecified manner. The Court was often called upon to strike his gratuitous remarks and cut off seemingly endless monologues. At one point, it became necessary to call a recess and instruct him to leave the courtroom temporarily and return "without the attitude".
It is indeed rare that a court is presented with a tissue of ready-made fabrications so extensive and far reaching that it literally mandates disbelief of a witness' entire testimony.
LIFESTYLE
Where, as here, the transcendent issue is maintenance, it is appropriate that the lifestyle of the parties be considered first. In this connection, it is relevant to point out that in the original enactment of DRL §236, et seq., the standard of living of the parties while married was listed as one of the enumerated factors to be considered by the trial court. The Legislature, later finding that consideration of lifestyle as one factor among many was "feminizing poverty', removed it as one of the in seriatum factors and inserted it in the preamble of subsection 6 thus granting it transcendent effect.
N's evidence of lifestyle was not effectively contraverted at the trial or in defendant's closing memorandum. Indeed, the thrust of J's closing argument once again disingenuously postulates without basis that the parties always lived beyond their means during their marriage. J's flow of income absolutely belies this. We therefore track herein plaintiff's recitation of the evidence as set forth in her closing argument.
At the time they were married, N and J moved to an apartment in New York. They immediately obtained full golf memberships at the Muttontown Country Club where they dined on weekends and where J would play golf. They also regularly dined at expensive New York City restaurants. On their many vacation trips, they hired private tour guides and routinely shopped at exclusive stores (Armani, Bottega Venetta, Gucci, Fendi, etc.).
N worked for her father in his jewelry business until their first child, A, was born on XXXX. Thereafter, she managed a Tiffany account part-time on recommendation from her father. She earned between $35,000 and $45,000 in 1989 and 1990 solely from commissions without relationship to time actually worked.
In 1988, N and J purchased a home and moved to Roslyn. The down payment came from proceeds of the sale of their New York City apartment and from gifts totaling $75,000 from N's parents and grandmother. N asserts no separate property claim for these monies.
In 1989, the parties gutted their home, adding 1,500 square feet (new kitchen, master bedroom and bath; windows and siding; new heating system; hot water heater and additional air conditioning zone) at an approximate cost of $300,000. In addition to the Muttontown membership, they also joined Pines Pool Club and the Atlantic Beach Club.
J and N employed a live-in housekeeper and sent the children to exclusive day and sleep-away camps. They also took lavish vacations-Vail, Colorado (rental of house and skiing); Lion's Head (approximately $12,000); Venetian Resort and Spa, Scottsdale, Arizona, ($10,000); Beaver Creek, ($12,000); Boca Raton, (numerous occasions); Disney World (numerous occasions); Sandy Lane, Barbados (five star hotel $12,000); Las Vegas, Ritz Carlton ($17,000); Italy: Hassler Hotel, Rome; Lugano Hotel, Florence; Bauer Hotel, Venice, ($18,500 hotels alone); Hawaii, Four Seasons Hotel ($11,500); Blacombe, Canada, Whistler Hotel, ($22,000); Anguilla ($22,000).
In May, 2005 N and J traveled to London twice to see a rock and roll group, purchasing tickets costing $800 each, (total concert cost $3,200, total with hotel, $15,000).
Needless to point out, J also took numerous trips with "friends," without N, including: Greece (with girl friend); Brandon Dune, Oregon; South Carolina (twice); Las Vegas, Bellagio Hotel (with girlfriend); Miravel Spa, Arizona (with girlfriend); Cancun; Sandy Hill, Nebraska; Miami (with girlfriend); South Carolina (golf trip). Numerous additional golf trips were elicited during trial.
N was primary caretaker of the children, responsible for the household's functioning. She was active in the children's education and sustained them in their medical issues which included A's XXXXX disorders, S's XXXXX and L's XXXXX, XXXXX and XXXXX.
N is 51 and in good health. J is 52.
Immediately prior to commencement, J entered into contracts and obtained estimates for additional renovation of the marital residence in an approximate sum of $100,000, to include the boys' bedrooms, new furniture, redoing the master bath and bedroom and redesigning the front entrance. He retained an architect (Spring, 2005) to carry these forth, while advancing a claim to the Court in bad faith that his business was failing. Indeed, when N learned of his extramarital affair, and upon his refusal to end it, it was N who stopped the work on the house and commenced this action.
N demands spousal maintenance of $5,416.67 per month ($65,000 per year) for fifteen years (citing DRL §236(B)(6)(a); DiBlasi v. DiBlasi, 48 AD3d 403), emphasizing her long-term marriage (cf. Chalif v. Chalif, 298 AD2d 348) and the luxurious standard of living enjoyed by the parties during marriage (Hartog v. Hartog, 85 NY2d 36 (1995)..
An award of maintenance, amount and duration thereof, is an issue vested in the sound discretion of the trial court.
In Hartog v. Hartog, supra, the parties, as here, were married for twenty years and were substantially the same age as N and J. Mrs. Hartog received substantial equitable distribution in excess of that which N's ultimate award will be here. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's grant of non-durational maintenance to Mrs. Hartog, citing Domestic Relations Law §236, et seq. which required that the Court give special consideration to the marital standard of living. It reinstated the trial court's decision calling for non-durational maintenance owing to Mrs. Hartog's inability to become self-supporting at a level commensurate with the marital standard of living. Holding that the legislative history of the statute unequivocally demonstrated the legislature's intent with regard to the pre-separation standard of living, Hartog emphasized that
"…the Wife's ability to become self-supporting with respect to some standard of living in no way obviates the need for the court to consider the pre-divorce standard of living, and does not create a per se bar to lifetime maintenance."
To be sure, N is capable of earning some money now. She currently works in a clerical capacity in a doctor's office earning minimal income ($12 per hour). Her claimed 'contacts" in the jewelry industry, stemmed primarily from her aged father and have dried up. She is untrained and uncredentialed. N will never have the capacity to earn sufficiently to resume her pre-separation standard of living. In the face of N's testimony that she might be capable of becoming self supporting in a lesser period of time, we respectfully believe her estimate to be overly optimistic and not supported by reality.
The Court declines to follow the conclusions of defendant's vocational expert who testified at the trial which were speculative and apparently tailored to minimize an appropriate award of maintenance to N.
The Court of Appeals in Summer v. Summer, 85 NY2d 114 (1995), reversing an appellate reduction of non-durational to durational maintenance and reinstating the trial court's decision held that "because Supreme Court's determination that the wife is incapable of becoming self-supporting at a level roughly commensurate with the marital standard of living comports with the weight of the evidence, we reinstate its judgment insofar as it awarded the wife permanent maintenance."
In Phillips v. Phillips, 182 AD2d 746, the Appellate Division in this Department affirmed an award of non-durational maintenance to a forty-nine year old wife based on a twenty-nine year marriage in which, the wife served as homemaker and sacrificed her career to care for three children. The husband, an attorney, earned between $100,000 and $200,000, the wife $15,400 with little apparent likelihood that her salary would increase to a point where she could become self-supporting. This holding closely approximates the facts before us.
In Bogannam v. Bogannam, 60 AD3d 985, the Second Department awarded ten years' maintenance following a twenty year marriage (husband's earnings $200,000).
Finally, in Kriftcher v. Kriftcher, 59 AD3d 392 the Second Department held that
"…although the wife earned a teaching license during the course of the marriage, she is, at present, primarily a homemaker, who works only part-time as a substitute teacher earning approximately $10,000 per year…. Considering, among other factors, the standard of living of the parties during the marriage, the distribution of marital property, the health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of both parties and the ability of the party seeking maintenance to be self-supporting…a maintenance award…for ten years is appropriate."
J's affidavit of Net Worth as of commencement, received in evidence listed the parties' monthly expenses at $28,521. On the eve of trial, his updated Net Worth Statement as of December, 2008 acknowledged "after-tax" monthly expenses of $20,341.34 ($244,092 per year). It included no expense for medical insurance, an additional cost to N to follow this divorce. DRL §236(B)(6)(11) as amended effective September 14, 2009, now requires the Court to consider "the loss of medical insurance" as a factor in awarding maintenance. 5
The Court has considered the mandatory factors made relevant by DRL §236, et seq. to the extent set forth without adhering to a slavish repetition thereof. N is awarded $65,000 per year as demanded based upon her needs and expenses as conceded by J in both sworn net worth statements. The parties' home has been sold. N has moved to an apartment with the children. Her rent and expenses while deviating from those listed in connection with the house by J in his net worth statement, do not appreciably alter her need for the award as requested.
Notwithstanding the request for 15 years of maintenance, N will reach the age of full eligibility for Social Security in 14 years on her 65th birthday. The duration of our maintenance award to her differs slightly from her request in that our award runs to her 65th birthday, no later.
While maintenance is usually taxable to the wife unless stated to the contrary by the Court, the Appellate Division in this Department has ruled that any award relieving the recipient spouse of taxable liability for it must articulate a reason (cf. Grumet v. Grumet, 37 AD3d 534). The award of maintenance herein to the wife shall be tax free to her. We rely here upon the testimony of D to the effect that J's scheme with reference to "goodwill" payments to ASs is illegal under the Internal Revenue Code. We believe it inconsistent with public policy to provide him with yet another outlet to minimize the entitlement of the taxpayers to their fair share of his earned income. We do not perceive the morality of rewarding him for this dubious practice by providing yet another opportunity for him to manipulate his funds to the detriment of the taxpayers.
J's true income as projected by D is $274,966 less FICA and Medicare totaling $10,311. Deducting $65,000 awarded herein for maintenance from J's base salary for CSSA purposes, yields a total of $199,655. It is conceded that both boys are emancipated leaving L as the only child requiring an order of support. The statutory percentage of 17 percent is applied to the CSSA net income (less maintenance) of $199,655 yielding a total figure for child support of $34,000 per annum. We respectfully believe it appropriate to apply this percentage, notwithstanding the statutory "cap', to the total base figure in view of L's special needs. All applications to impute income to N for purposes of computation are denied as being without basis in fact or law.
We reiterate here that which we have indicated during trial that from a review of the credible evidence, D's figure is a conservative estimate not approaching our own estimate of J's actual income. Nevertheless, we are bound by propriety not to exceed the demand on record, lacking any showing that the demanded amount is inadequate to meet L's needs.
AUXILIARY DIRECTIVES
All monies now being held by J's attorneys in escrow or otherwise shall be transferred into custodial accounts and earmarked for college for S and L with N as custodian pursuant to stipulation dated August 21, 2009. Should these funds be inadequate to pay tuition, room and board in accordance with standards prevailing at SUNY (Binghamton campus), all additional funds shall be paid by the parties on a 90/10 allocation basis. This order is effective retroactive to the Fall, 2009 semester.
J is directed to obtain and keep in effect a life insurance policy of $4,000,000 to secure maintenance and child support payments. Duplicate premium notices addressed to N shall be arranged for by J.
J shall maintain medical and dental coverage for the unemancipated child and be responsible for 90 percent of all unreimbursed expenditures. To the extent feasible by law, no out-of-network providers shall be used without J's or, in the alternative, the court's approval.
J is ordered to pay the overdue sum of $18,250 to Doctor S for N's dental work. Failing same, the Court will direct entry of judgment against him upon appropriate application.
The funds now held by Oppenheimer representing an IRA of approximately $30,000 and a 401K in AS/GM of approximately $64,000 shall be divided equally. This directive shall be implemented by retention of Lexington consultants to draw appropriate QDRO orders with fees for same split equally between the parties.
N is awarded $60,699.50 representing 50 percent of the marital Madoff funds taken by J (cf. Exhibit 11) for his own purposes.
Counsel for defendant now holds $155,410 in escrow pursuant to written stipulation dated March 16, 2009. The husband's share of this escrow fund has been properly disbursed in accordance with this stipulation. The balance thereof belongs to N and shall be distributed accordingly.
During the trial, J moved for downward modification in the face of a "so ordered" stipulation to the effect that the applicable standard for modification would be "extreme hardship" and the further fact that he had already unsuccessfully moved for this relief once. This second motion which had been referred to the trial by the undersigned is denied.
The parties have disposed of the marital domicile by sale. A stipulation dealing with distribution of various sums of money not necessarily pertaining to the sale itself has been executed by the parties and is approved.
COUNSEL FEES
Plaintiff's application for counsel fees to the firm of B and R in the sum of $340,000 is granted based upon the equities of the case (O'Shea v. O'Shea, 83 NY2d 187); the relative circumstances of both parties (Charpie v. Charpie, 271 AD2d 169); the added burden imposed upon counsel by unreasonable and groundless claims (Brancoveanu v. Brancoveanu, 177 AD2d 614); the presence of imputed or hidden income (Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 AD2d 702); the unnecessary prolongation of litigation by one party (Ventimiglia v. Ventimiglia, 36 AD2d 899); and attempts by one party to frustrate, discourage and otherwise intimidate the other (Schussler v. Schussler, 109 AD2d 875; Lowinger v. Lowinger, 245 AD2d 490). Counsel has fully complied with the appropriate rules promulgated by the Office of Court Administration. We find that counsel possesses the stature, ability, reputation and respect appropriate for these fees. The time charges claimed for performance of counsel's duties are reasonable, even conservative.
All claims, if any, for arrears or for retroactive effect to be extended to any order herein shall be brought on by motion in writing with supporting affidavits computing same with specificity prior to submission of final judgment.
Stipulations between the parties resolving a number of issues as presented with final submissions are approved. All issues addressed in the final submissions unresolved as of that time are now deemed fully resolved.
All prayers for relief by either party not addressed by this decision are hereby denied.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this Court.
Settle final judgment on notice.
The Clerk shall retain all exhibits pending expiration of time to appeal.
1. Removed.
2. "Chutzpah (Yiddish)-unbelievable gall; insolence; audacity; cheekiness, impertinence, impudence, crust, gall, the trait of being rude and impertinent, inclined to take liberties."
Collins English Dictionary-6th edition, 2003
The Court of Appeals has encountered the necessity of expressing itself with this metaphor (cf. People v. Campbell, 97 NY2d 532).
3. D, CPA, an expert witness who evaluated those entities prior to trial, citing IRS Code Section 482, testified that the only legal method to determine the value of a licensing fee is upon an arm's length transaction for the value of the licensed assets, a proposition whose validity was acknowledged by J's own bankruptcy expert witness SP, Esq. Thus, if J is to be believed that AS "went out of business" or had "no value" as of the Fall of 2008, there could be no "fair market value" for the Licensing Agreement and certainly no consideration for it. Furthermore, the "Licensing Agreement" permitted the parties thereto, AS and GM, both alter egos of J, to change the licensing fee at will.
4. AS's "reviewed" financial statements from 2000 through June 30, 2008 have been received in evidence.
5. In addition to any monetary award, J is directed to fully cooperate in N's attempts to obtain COBRA coverage. ¦
SUPREMECourt
J.H.O. Gartenstein
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| February 01, 2010 |
| Fair Warning for those who Contribute Little to a Marriage |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
 |
In the below decision from Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice Gargiulo denies equal distribution in a case where the wife contributed nothing to the economic partnership, neither through her work or her by contributing her own money. In this case the Judge found that the wife had been siphoning off company funds throughout the marriage. The Judge also denied counsel fees on the theory that it was plainly obvious that the wife was not entitled to the requested relief and as such the Judge would not grant counsel fees merely to allow the wife to play with "house money" in trying to receive a larger degree of equitable distribution. This warning is fair warning to those who put nothing into an economic partnership, but intend to take half of everything with them when they leave.
S v. S, 29475-2007
Decided: January 26, 2010
Justice Garguilo
This is an action for Absolute Divorce commenced by the plaintiff, A.S., against the defendant, E.S. The Court took testimony as to grounds and makes its findings hereinafter allowing divorce on the basis of constructive abandonment (DRL §170(2)). Thereafter, the trial was held before this Court ending on November 6, 2009.
The court has had a full opportunity to consider the evidence presented with respect to the issues in this proceeding including all the testimony offered and all exhibits received. Furthermore, the Court observed the demeanor of the witnesses and has made determinations concerning the credibility of these witnesses. The Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
A. GROUNDS:
1. The parties were married on August 7, 1999 within the State of New York.
2. The Action for Divorce was commenced on or about October 10, 2007.
3. The plaintiff-wife, at the time of trial, was 47 years old. The defendant-husband, at the time of trial, was 57 years old. The health of the parties is not in issue.
4. There are no children of the marriage. Both were previously divorced and do have children of their prior marriages. In 2002, the plaintiff had commenced an action for divorce which was discontinued.
5. At the time of the commencement of this action, both plaintiff and defendant were residents of the State of New York and both had prior thereto continuously resided in the State of New York for a period in excess of two years. Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant are in the military service of the United States, and there is no judgment or decree of divorce, separation or annulment granted with respect to this marriage by this Court or any other court of competent jurisdiction and no other actions are pending at the present time.
6. Both parties agree to take, prior to the entry of a filed Judgment, all steps solely within their power to remove any barrier to the other's remarriage following divorce. The Court finds it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.
7. The Court finds that the defendant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily constructively abandoned the plaintiff with respect to the grounds alleged by the plaintiff in her Verified Complaint. The Court finds credible the testimony of the plaintiff that since on or about March, 2006, and continuing, the defendant, without just cause or provocation, willfully refused to co-habit with the plaintiff as man and wife and to have normal sexual relations with the plaintiff, despite plaintiff's repeated requests of the defendant to resume normal sexual relations. Both plaintiff and defendant are physically capable of engaging in same and neither party suffers from any physical or mental disability which would preclude marital relations. The Court finds that said refusal has been continuous, unjustified and unprovoked. Consequently, the plaintiff proved, and the Court finds as fact, those allegations as set forth in paragraphs Eighth, Ninth and Tenth of her Verified Complaint dated April 20, 2009. Oral applications to conform the pleadings to the proofs were granted. The defendant has neither admitted and/or denied the allegations.
B. DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY:
8. Marital property is defined in Domestic Relations Law §236B(1)(c) as "All property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage." The issues both prosecuted and defended by the parties, in large measure, concern the identity of the property (marital vs. separate) and the relative share of each party.
The following are the properties at issue:
a) 3 Frances Lane, Port Jefferson, New York (the marital residence).
b) Home Companion Services of New York, Inc.
1
c) Home Companion Services of Florida, Inc.
d) Access Home Care, Inc.
e) Arcadia Management, Inc.
f) Green Fields East Holding, LLC.
g) Janney Montgomery Scott accounts:
i. XXXX-0213
ii. XXXX-0116 (529 Plan)
iii. XXXX-0170 (Roth IRA)
iv. XXXX-0045
v. XXXX-2840 (profit sharing)
vi. Arcadia Management (401K)
h) HSBC Accounts:
923XXXXXX
923XXXXXX
253XXXXXX
I) ING Account:
73322014
j) Time Shares:
I. Manhattan Club
ii. Bahamas
k) Vehicles:
I. 2003 Nissan
ii. 2009 Nissan X-terra
iii. Mercedes-Benz (leased)
DISCUSSION
The plaintiff seeks a 50 percent share of the marital portion of all the business interests in accordance with the stipulated values determined by the neutral appraiser. As to the marital residence, the plaintiff seeks a 50 percent share of its value in accordance with the stipulated value determined by the neutral appraiser and exclusive occupancy of said residence until such time as the home is sold. Additionally, plaintiff seeks a 50 percent share of all retirement accounts and all the other enumerated funds. Green Fields East Holding, LLC controls defendant's share of realty located in Aquebogue, New York. The plaintiff is seeking a 50 percent share "of the equity in the property located in Aquebogue, in accordance with the stipulated value determined by the neutral appraiser." The plaintiff seeks title to the Bahamas time share as well as a distributive award and/or credit in the sum of $11,500 representing the balance of her claimed 50 percent share in the two marital time share units. Lastly, the plaintiff seeks exclusive title and possession of the 2003 Nissan vehicle.
The defendant does not suggest any percentage as concerns the distributive award aspects of the case. However, the defendant, in his post-trial memorandum, suggests "plaintiff herein was clearly not a contributing member of an economic partnership with defendant." In stark contrast, the plaintiff, in her post-trial memorandum, characterizes her contributions in phrases such as "the expansive nature of her ongoing contributions is clear;" "her direct and daily involvement in the business…vast indirect contributions;" "Allison's (plaintiff) significant direct and indirect contributions to the success and viability of the businesses;" and, "significant and unquestioned contributions to her husband and the businesses."
The Domestic Relations Law contemplates an equitable division of assets based upon the parties' respective contributions to the marriage (see, Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(5)(d)(6)). The distribution of the assets depends not only on the financial contributions of the parties, "but also on a wide range of non-remunerated services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising children and providing the emotional and moral support necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the vicissitudes of life outside the home," (Price v. Price, 69 NY2d 8, 14 [1986]).
The Court has considered the marital history and will enumerate the factors considered in arriving at an equitable distribution of marital property (DRL §236(B)(5)(d)). At the time of the marriage, the defendant was (and currently remains) the driving, tireless source of the success of the business interests. He came to the marriage as a responsible entrepreneur earning a handsome living. The plaintiff came into the marriage with poor credit. This is borne out as the trial testimony indicated that the marital home, purchased days before the wedding, was purchased solely with defendant's money. The plaintiff could not participate in the purchase as she had bad credit. The record is quite clear that the plaintiff offered virtually nothing to enhance the growth of the business interests and/or the accumulation of additional assets.
The marriage, as noted earlier, was the second marriage of both parties. This marriage is of relatively short duration as the wedding occurred on August 7, 1999 and the action commenced in October of 2007.
There being no children of the marriage, the issue of a "custodial parents [need] to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects," is not a consideration.
Neither party offered evidence reflecting DRL §236(B) (5) (d)(4), (7), (9), (10) or (12). Nonetheless, the Court does note that liquidity issues (DRL §236(B)(5)(d)(7) pose no compelling considerations.
Pursuant to DRL §236(B)(5)(d)(13), the Court may consider "any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper." Given the credible testimony of the non-party witnesses, it is an affront to the sensibilities of the finder of fact to suggest the plaintiff to be or have been anything but a consumer, user and abuser of her status as the boss's wife. To claim the plaintiff to be an element in any way responsible for the defendant's success in business and/or investments is equally an affront. The plaintiff has not demonstrated to any degree the contribution of non-remunerated services to the joint enterprises.
During the course of this short, rocky relationship, nothing tied the plaintiff to the marital home. There is no rearing of children, maintaining the marital abode and/or active participation in fostering the growth of defendant's enterprises. At the time the plaintiff took employment with her husband's companies, she abused her stature as the boss's wife. She came and went as she pleased and neglected accounts, costing the business dearly. She engaged in self-dealing by secretly siphoning money.
On the home front, she allowed her sons from a prior marriage to run amok, damage, soil and show no respect for the defendant's proprietary rights. In short, to suggest any kind of symbiosis between the plaintiff and defendant is sheer fiction. The plaintiff's presence, as suggested by the record, was parasitic.
It is elementary that equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, Rizutto v. Rizutto, 250 AD2d 892 (1998). Equitable distribution presents issues of fact which the Court must resolve,Teabout v. Teabout, 269 AD2d 719 (2000). In partitioning property, the Court should consider the separate contributions of each party to the acquisition and improvement of the property, Quattrone v. Quattrone, 210 AD2d 306 (1996). The Court must also consider the parties' respective contributions to the family economic enterprise, Johnson v. Johnson, 49 AD2d 348 (2008).
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE
The marital residence at 3 Frances Lane, Port Jefferson, New York was purchased by the defendant prior to the marriage (August 5, 1999). The purchase price was $425,000. The sum of $145,000 came directly from proceeds of a sale of defendant's condominium. The home, upon closing, was encumbered with a $280,000 mortgage solely in defendant's name. The plaintiff did not contribute money to the acquisition of the home.
During March of 2005, the defendant conveyed his interest in the marital home to himself and the plaintiff as tenants by the entirety. There was no consideration for the transfer.
The neutral appraiser, Given Associates, valued the residence at the time of the transfer at $900,000. Shortly before commencement of this trial, the neutral appraiser determined the value of the premises to be $765,000. The marital residence declined in value by $135,000 from conveyance to trial. The sum of $40,000 paid for improvements is reflective of improvements made wholly with funds supplied by the defendant. Those funds came from his income earned post marriage. The record is further clear that all funds to carry the home were derived from defendant's self employment.
The plaintiff seeks 50 percent distribution of the net value after crediting defendant with the sum he actually spent to take possession of the house ($145,000) citing Coffey v. Coffey, 119AD2d 620 (2nd Dept.1986). The Court deciding Coffey in remanding the matter to determine the increase in value from the date the transferring spouse acquired the separate property to the date of transfer to his spouse clearly found the pre-transfer appreciation to be relevant. Why so? The Court noted:
At the outset, it is important to note that there is no requirement that distribution of each item of marital property be on an equal basis (see, Arvantides v. Arvantides, 64 NY2d 1033, 1034; Parsons v. Parsons, supra.; Ackley v. Ackley, supra.; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 98 AD2d 386, 390-391, appeal dismissed 62 NY2d 646). Rather, property acquired during the marriage should be distributed "in a manner which reflects the individual needs and circumstances of the parties" (mem of Governor Carey, 1980 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1863). To this end, courts possess the flexibility required to mold a decree appropriate to a given situation, with fairness being the ultimate goal (see, Rodgers v. Rodgers, supra., at p 391).
The court went on to further comment:
In accordance with these principles, in the case at bar, the husband should receive a credit for the contribution of his separate property toward the creation of the marital assets (see, Parsons v. Parsons, 101 AD2d 1017; Duffy v. Duffy, 94 AD2d 711; Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(5)(d)(10)).
The Coffey court noted that the record was "devoid of evidence of the value of the marital residence at the time of the 1973 conveyance." The 1973 conveyance was the one that created marital property as the husband deeded the property to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety.
The matter before this Court suffers no lack of evidence similar to Coffey. As noted earlier, the property was acquired, pre-marriage, separately. It was valued at $425,000. At the time of the conveyance to plaintiff, it was valued at $900,000. At or near the time of trial, it was valued at $765,000. As a finding, the Court concludes that the value of the marital residence declined $135,000 during its tenure as marital property. Worthy of note is the fact that the defendant-husband paid virtually all carrying charges on the home from his earned income.
The logic of the Coffey court in holding that the grantor spouse should "receive a credit for the contribution of his separate property toward the creation of the marital assets" and thereafter remanding the matter to take "evidence of the value of the marital residence at the time of the conveyance" compels this Court to find the defendant-husband's contribution of his separate property is $900,000. As the asset depreciated, the plaintiff is ORDERED to execute a quit claim deed (without any payment from the defendant) transferring her interest in the marital premises to the defendant-husband, fee simple absolute.
In deciding this case, the Court referenced Granade-Bastuck v. Bastuck, 249 AD2d 444, 671 NYS2d 512(App. Div. 2d Dept., 1998). A prime consideration of that court in sustaining a 50 percent award of the husband's non-business properties was that the wife made non-economic contributions to the marriage which allowed the couple to "amass a substantial marital estate." No such contributions were made by the plaintiff herein.
The marital home herein was improved by construction projects. Those improvements are incorporated into the appraisal of the home and the funds were derived wholly from defendant-husband's post-marriage income. The defendant-husband is directed to pay to plaintiff the sum of $10,000 representing a distributive award concerning the improvements. Both the quit claim deed and payment of funds shall occur within thirty (30) days of service of a copy of the decision and order with notice of entry. The plaintiff is ORDERED to vacate the premises no later than thirty (30) days after service of a copy of the decision and order with notice of entry.
BUSINESS INTERESTS
The plaintiff seeks a 50 percent share (distributive award) of the marital value of her husband's business interests. Plaintiff claims such an award:
"[i]s appropriate, given the magnitude of her contributions, and the manner in which her labor, services and indirect contributions helped grow the business into the successful enterprise it is today."
The record supports an extremely different scenario. Testimony of Susan Farrar (an employee of the defendant) was credible. She has been an employee of the defendant for approximately twenty (20) years. The witness testified that the labor, marketing and networking skills of the defendant transformed his chiropractic practice into a thriving home companion business. The plaintiff, herself, acknowledged Home Companion Services of New York was conceived through defendant's insight. Testimony of S F and D K, another employee, demonstrated that the plaintiff engaged in affirmative bad acts in drawing checks payable to cash and deleting same from the operating account register to avoid detection. Plaintiff's assertion that same was done with the consent of the defendant is patently incredulous. Why would the defendant, the boss, encourage his wife to write checks to cash and delete same from the register? Perhaps to give his auditors something else to do?
Financial Appraisal Services, Ltd., the neutral, court-ordered forensic accountant, found an appreciation of $1,146,000.00 of Home Companion Services of New York during the marriage. The company was founded three (3) years before the marriage. The plaintiff's contributions to the growth of that entity is undetectable. It is the decision of the Court that plaintiff's distributive award of the business entities is zero dollars. As noted earlier, the plaintiff's cavalier approach to work attendance, misfeasance, malfeasance and disruptive nature substantiate the finding herein consistent with Granade-Bastuck v. Bastuck (249 AD2d 444) in correlating a distributive award to the party's non-economic contributions to the marriage which allowed the couple to "amass a substantial marital estate."
The Court's determination concerning business interests applies to those entities noted herein at B, (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f).
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIOS
Several investment portfolios and bank accounts were the subject of the distribution claims. The testimony remains uncontroverted that all monies represented by the accounts came from income generated by the husband. However, a good deal of said income was earned during the marriage. That income used to fund the investment vehicles is marital property.
The plaintiff seeks a 50 percent distributive award of all the funds. The defendant concedes a distribution "consistent with the respective financial contributions of the parties."
Clearly the plaintiff made no financial contributions to these accounts. However, it is clear that monies represented in the accounts are a marital asset as that term is defined. The Court awards the plaintiff as follows:
J M S accounts:
1. XXXX-0213—10 percent of the value at the date of commencement of this action.
2. XXXX-0116 (529 Plan)—0 percent
3. XXXX-0170 (Roth IRA)—10 percent of the value at the date of the commencement of this action.
4. XXXX-0045—10 percent of the value at the date of commencement of this action.
5. XXXX-2840 (profit sharing)—10 percent of the value at the date of commencement of this action after crediting the defendant $32,719.59. The Court has carved out that sum as the defendant's separate property, the sum of $32,719.59 being defendant's monies in the Janney accounts pre-marriage and therefore separate property.
6. Arcadia Management (401K)—10 percent of the value at date of commencement of this action.
The accounts with HSBC and ING are marital property. The plaintiff shall receive as her distributive award 10 percent of the value of each account at the date of commencement.
In awarding the plaintiff a portion of the accounts, the court has given weight to her testimony concerning some domestic responsibilities assumed during the marriage. The plaintiff testified working with decorators involving drapery, the living room, painting, carpeting and bedding (pillows). Additionally, the plaintiff offered testimony concerning her work in cleaning the home as well as serving breakfast and dinners. The Court, in seeking equity, despite all else, chose to credit plaintiff for her services.
The two time shares will be sold. The proceeds shall be divided 10 percent to the plaintiff, 90 percent to the defendant. In lieu of sale, either party may buy the other's interest at a gross valuation of $30,000 (Manhattan Club) and $7,000 (Bahamas). More particularly, the defendant may buy out the plaintiff by tendering 10 percent of the gross values as set forth hereinabove.
The plaintiff is awarded the 2003 Nissan motor vehicle. All other vehicles are awarded to the defendant.
425 OLD TOWN ROAD PROPERTY
The real estate and building housing the defendant's business (425 Old Town Road, Port Jefferson Station, New York) was acquired by the defendant some ten (10) years before the marriage. It is separate property. The plaintiff offered no testimony concerning value, appreciation or the like. The property shall remain the defendant's separate property.
MAINTENANCE
The plaintiff is seeking an award of maintenance in the sum of $3,000 per week for a period of five (5) years. The defendant has been paying the plaintiff $500 per week in pendente lite spousal support, retroactive to October 16, 2007. The duration of this marriage is approximately eight (8) years.
Plaintiff cites Fuchs v. Fuchs, 276 AD2d 868, 714 NYS2d 381 in support of her claim. The marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Fuchs endured for thirty (30) years. They reared four (4) children. That court restated the accepted proposition that:
It is well settled that determination of whether one of the parties in a matrimonial action is entitled to maintenance and, if so, the amount to be awarded falls within the broad discretionary powers of Supreme Court (see, Domestic Relations Law §236[B][6][a]; Cohen v. Cohen, 154 AD2d 808, 809; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 144 AD2d 797, 798, appeal dismissed 73 NY2d 992).
The marriage before this Court is of a short duration. The plaintiff's contributions were at best de-minimus. Her acts of misfeasance and malfeasance have been addressed. She came into the marriage with "bad credit" and no testimony reflects any separate property except perhaps a child support entitlement from a prior marriage. She is currently under-employed and as noted hereinabove has received pendent lite spousal support for almost three (3) years. During that three (3) year period, the record is clear that the plaintiff has taken few steps to attain some form of self-sufficiency.
In lieu of any future maintenance, the defendant is directed to pay 50 percent of plaintiff's credit obligations, not to exceed $27,950. Said sum representing 50 percent of plaintiff's credit obligations on the date of commencement. In consideration of said payment, the defendant shall be discharged from any alleged arrears for unpaid medical bills limited to $1,000.
COUNSEL FEES
The plaintiff seeks a separate counsel fee award of $47,467.02. To date, defendant has paid $16,000 toward plaintiff's counsel fees.
In support of her application for counsel fees, plaintiff correctly points out:
Domestic Relations Law Section 237 expressly authorizes the award of legal fees. To discourage the use of litigation as a form of economic harassment, courts must grant reasonable and substantive awards of counsel fees that will reflect the current value of legal services, and the nature of the services that must be rendered.
The matter at bar presents itself as one where the plaintiff's demands for an equal distribution of all marital properties is preposterous. It is preposterous given the facts which were known to the parties going into trial. The defendant is successful. His properties are very valuable. Is the award of counsel fees in the best interest of all when it becomes apparent that a party's mind set is to proceed to trial and play with the "house's money"? In this case, the "house's money" is embodied in the prospect that win, lose or draw, we can count on Mr. S to pay his wife's cover charge.
The Court denies the plaintiff's fee application
It is, therefore, the ORDER of this Court that within thirty (30) days after service of a copy of this Order with Notice of Entry that:
1. The plaintiff will deliver a quit claim deed to the marital premises to the defendant and vacate the premises.
2. That the defendant will pay the plaintiff the sum of $10,000 representing marital property (money) paid for improvements of the marital home.
3. That all the business interests shall become the separate property of the defendant.
4. That the defendant shall tender the appropriate sums of money from the various retirement investment and bank accounts consistent with this decision.
5. That the defendant shall tender all documents necessary to transfer the 2003 Nissan vehicle to the plaintiff.
6. That the defendant shall tender the sums of money to the plaintiff to resolve the credit card obligations consistent with this decision.
Furthermore, the parties are directed to submit, on notice, proposed Judgments consistent with the Court's determination on or before MARCH 5, 2010.
The foregoing constitutes the ORDER of this Court.
1. Items (b) through (e) are collectively referred to as the "Business Interests."
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| December 11, 2009 |
| Tiger Woods' Marital Woes |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
 |
The events that have unfolded after the unfortunate incident at Tiger Woods' home at 2:30 AM on the day after Thanksgiving have been nothing short of extraordinary. There have been rumors of infidelity with as many as twelve different women. There have also been rumors that Mr. Woods will have to renegotiate his pre-nuptial agreement with his wife Elin Nordegren, a former model. In my experience Mr. Woods should be thankful that he had a pre-nuptial agreement in the first place. Although recent news reports have estimated that she will receive up to $100,000,000.00, if the couple divorces, this number seems highly unlikely. It is far more likely that he signed a pre-nuptial agreement for somewhere between ten and twenty million dollars. Even if he renegotiates this in order to save his marriage and adds another five or ten million, it would still be a tiny percentage of his net worth. This situation illustrates the necessity for someone like Mr. Woods signing a pre-nuptial agreement. His public image may be tarnished temporarily; however, his bank balance will not be taking a serious hit. His reported one billion dollar net worth should remain mostly intact.
It is important to hire a lawyer who stays up to date on the latest developments in the law. For further information about The Law Offices of Brian D. Perskin please
click here.
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| August 20, 2009 |
| Justice Sunshine Explains Equitable Distrubution |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
 |
In the below decision the Honorable Justice Jeffrey Sunshine explains and applies the law regarding
equitable distribution. This is a complex area of the law which Justice Sunshine applies. This case illustrates why it is important to have a lawyer who is experienced in divorce law. Justice Sunshine is forced to dismiss parts of this motion for the failure to file the appropriate paper work with the motion.
I have over 20 years experience in filing these types of actions and am very familiar with the courts' requirements for motion practice. In addition, I am well versed in the law surrounding the underlying issue which Justice Sunshine thoroughly explains.
VP v. IP,
Decided: June 24, 2009
Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine
KINGS COUNTY
Supreme Court
Upon the foregoing papers, plaintiff the husband moves for summary judgment as a matter of law: (1) pursuant to CPLR 3212(c) and Domestic Relations Law (DRL) §236, dismissing the claim of defendant the wife to share in his alleged enhanced earnings capacity from the courses of study that he completed at Long Island University (LIU); (2) pursuant to CPLR 3212(c) and DRL §236, dismissing defendant's claim of a right to share in his alleged enhanced earning capacity from the medical degree that he obtained from Ross University Medical School (Medical School); and (3) pursuant to CPLR 3212(c) and DRL §236, dismissing defendant's claim of a right to share in his alleged enhanced earning capacity from the one year of medical residency that he completed prior to the commencement of the instant divorce action that had not then resulted in any degree or license. Defendant cross moves for an order, pursuant to DRL §237, granting her attorneys' fees and costs in defending this motion. Facts and Procedural Background
Plaintiff commenced the instant action on April 24, 2008 seeking a judgment of divorce and other ancillary relief.
The parties were married on June 25, 1993, in Sevastopol, Ukraine and immigrated to the United States in 1996. Plaintiff entered the marriage with the American equivalent of a bachelor's degree and defendant entered the marriage with a certification as a hair stylist. Upon their arrival in this country, the wife obtained employment in a hair salon and the husband worked odd jobs because he could no longer teach agility and fitness to soldiers as he had done in the Ukraine. On September 7, 1997, the parties' son was born.
Between September 1997 and December 2000, plaintiff attended LIU as a full-time student so that he could become proficient in English and apply to medical school; during this time, plaintiff continued to work part time in odd jobs. Plaintiff did not receive any degree from LIU. From January 10, 2001 through April 2002, he attended Medical School, which was located in the Dominica in the West Indies; during this time, defendant remained in Brooklyn with the parties' son. Plaintiff returned home for about a week and then left to complete another portion of his education in Miami, where he remained for nine weeks, from May 2002 to July 2002; defendant again remained at home with the parties' son. On December 20, 2002, plaintiff passed the first step of the United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE). Between December 2002 and November 2004, plaintiff continued his education at Kings County Hospital and Brookdale Hospital, where he did his clinical rotations. On May 28, 2004, plaintiff passed the second USMLE. Plaintiff completed Medical School in January 2005 and graduated on April 1, 2005. From July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2006, he was a resident at New York Hospital, earning a salary of approximately $46,000. In July 2006, plaintiff changed his specialty and he became an anesthesiology resident at Nassau University Medical Center on July 1, 2006, where he is currently in his third year of residency, earning approximately $55,000 per year. On November 26, 2007, plaintiff took and passed the third USMLE.
During the time that plaintiff attended LIU, defendant continued to work full time at the hair salon. Beginning in September 2001 through October 2004, defendant attended night school at Touro College and continued to work full-time in the hair salon during the day. Defendant became licensed as an assistant physical therapist in August 2006.
In December 2005, plaintiff left the marital residence.
As is also relevant herein, this court previously appointed a neutral appraiser to value plaintiff's enhanced earning capacity. By report dated October 31, 2008, Financial Appraisal Services, Ltd., concluded that plaintiff's enhanced earning capacity resulting from the education that he received during the marriage was $1,584,000, taking into account an appropriate reduction for plaintiff's student loans and the remaining 11 percent of the training required for plaintiff to become a board certified anesthesiologist.
The Parties' Contention
The Husband
In support of his motion, plaintiff argues that defendant should not be entitled to share in the enhanced earning capacity that she claims resulted from the 98 courses that he took at LIU between September 1997 and December 2000 because the courses did not result in his obtaining any degree or certification and were only "a stepping-stone to a license to practice medicine," which he has not yet obtained. Plaintiff further argues that defendant should not be entitled to share in the enhanced earning capacity resulting from the courses that he took at Medical School, because his medical degree has no value without a medical license, which requires a minimum of three years of residency and passing three examinations. Plaintiff similarly contends that defendant should not be entitled to share in the enhanced earning capacity resulting from the one year residency that he completed prior to the commencement of the action on the grounds that he still had two years of residency to complete at that time. Accordingly, plaintiff argues that as of the time of commencement of this action, he did not have a medical license or board certification that would be subject to equitable distribution, since the only degree that he obtained was his medical degree, which, without a license, was worthless. In this regard, plaintiff avers that he will not complete his studies until July 2009.
Plaintiff also argues that defendant did not make a significant contribution to his enhanced earning capacity, since she did not sacrifice her career or change her lifestyle for his education. More particularly, plaintiff alleges that while the parties were residing together, defendant attended school at the same time that he did. Between September 1997 and January 2000, while he attended LIU, defendant worked at the hair salon from 8:00 AM. to 4:00 PM, and then went to school at night, so that she was out of the house from 8:00 AM until 9:00 PM four nights each week. During this time, plaintiff avers that his mother and father, who lived one floor above him and his wife, cared for the parties' son on a full time basis. In this regard, plaintiff also emphasizes that the parties separated in December 2005, so that defendant did not make any contributions towards his education after this date.
Plaintiff further contends that from January 2001 until the time he completed medical school in July 2005, he borrowed the entire cost of his tuition, i.e., he received $1,800 to $2,000 per month in student loans to pay for the parties' living expenses, which money was deposited into the parties' joint checking account and was used by defendant to pay the family's bills. Plaintiff corroborates this contention with copies of the parties' bank account statements and student loan documents. Plaintiff also avers that although defendant contends that she earned $3,500 per month from her job, much of that money was not deposited into the parties' bank account.
Plaintiff also submits an affidavit from his father, in which he alleges that from July 1, 1996 until July 23, 2005, he and his wife lived in the same apartment complex as did plaintiff, defendant and their son. The father further avers that from the birth of the child until he was about two years and four months old, the father and his wife were the child's only caretakers. Commencing in January 2000, when the child was 28 months old, he started attending pre-school; plaintiff or defendant would take the child to school and the father or his wife would pick him up. When the child turned three, defendant began attending college, first to learn to speak English and then to obtain further education. During this time, defendant did not return home until 8:00 or 9:00 at night. The father accordingly concludes that since defendant worked every day and went to school every night from the beginning of 2000 until October 2004, he and his wife essentially acted as Stanley's parents. In addition, defendant vacationed in the Ukraine on three separate occasions for three weeks each trip, while the father and his wife cared for the child.
The Wife
In opposition to the husband's motion and in support of her cross motion, the wife argues that the husband's education and training is marital property subject to equitable distribution and that she substantially contributed to his enhanced earning capacity by providing the family with the bulk of their economic support, arranging and paying for child care, cleaning, cooking, paying the bills and attending to all household chores. In this regard, defendant avers that from September 1997 to January 2000, she paid for the bulk of the household expenses because plaintiff was a full-time student and only worked on occasions at his aunt's grocery store. She further alleges that during the time that plaintiff attended Medical School in Dominica, he contributed about $1,000 every three to four months for household expenses; accordingly, defendant paid the majority of the expenses. She therefore contends that her doing so allowed plaintiff to go to school at LIU and to go to Medical School in Dominica and Miami. In addition, because she went to school at night, it took her six years to complete a two year physical therapist assistant program.
Defendant also contends that plaintiff's contention that his medical degree is not subject to equitable distribution because it does confer upon him the right to practice medicine is "erroneous and maliciously deceiving" because he fulfilled all of the requirements needed to obtain a license to practice medicine before the action was commenced. More specifically, he completed the necessary study on April 1, 2005, when he graduated from Medical School, he passed the third required USMLE on November 26, 2007 and he completed one year of residency. In so arguing, defendant relies upon sections 6524 and 6528 of the New York State Medicine Education Law to argue that after graduating from Medical School, all plaintiff had to do to obtain his license was to pass the three USMLEs and fulfill a one year residency requirement, i.e., all that remained to be done was to file an application and pay the appropriate fee.
The Husband's Reply
In reply, the husband again argues that he could not sit for the board examination to be an anesthesiologist until November 2009, which is 19 months after the date that the instant action was commenced. Hence, he was not a licensed physician or anesthesiologist on the date of commencement. Further, at the time that the parties separated, he had taken only one of the three USMLEs that he needed and he was only five months into his first residency. Plaintiff admits that although defendant paid the vast majority of the parties' expenses while he was attending LIU, this was not the case between 2000 and 2005.
Defendant's Addendum
In an addendum to her affirmation in opposition, defendant alleges that in order to be eligible for a medical license, the New York State Department of Education/State University of New York requires that plaintiff complete three years of training, i.e., three years of residency; he need not complete a residency in one medical discipline or specialty. Herein, plaintiff obtained his medical degree on April 1, 2005. He was then a resident at New York Hospital Queens from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006; on July 1, 2006, he became a resident at Nassau University Medical Center, where he is currently employed. Thus, he has now completed approximately three years and eight months of his residency, having completed two years and nine months at the date of commencement of the action on April 24, 2008. In addition, he passed the first USMLE on December 20, 2002, he passed the second on May 28, 2004 and he passed the third on November 26, 2007. Defendant thus alleges that although plaintiff was not able to obtain his medical license as of the date of commencement, he is now eligible to do so. Accordingly, she concludes that the value of his license should be prorated to reflect that portion of the enhanced earnings obtained during the marriage, or 89 percent of the value. Defendant further avers that plaintiff is improperly trying to protect that portion of the education leading to his license by confusing the requirements for becoming an anesthesiologist with the requirements for becoming a licensed physician.
Plaintiff's Supplemental Affidavit
In his affidavit in reply, plaintiff alleges that defendant now concedes that as of the date of commencement of the action, he still needed to complete three additional months of residency before he was eligible to apply for his medical license. Accordingly, he again argues that since he had not completed the course of study necessary to obtain a medical license prior to commencement of the action, no medical license existed at the time to be valued. He further avers that he will not complete the training necessary to become an anesthesiologist until after he takes a written exam in November 2009 and an oral exam in April 2010.
Plaintiff further argues that the only thing that remains to be valued is his medical degree. He again argues, however, that inasmuch as defendant did not make a substantial contribution to his education, she should not be awarded any share of the enhanced earning capacity resulting from the degree. He further argues that his enhanced earning capacity should not be based upon him being a board certified anesthesiologist, since he will not complete that course of study until 24 months after the instant action for divorce was commenced. He concludes that:
"Thus, the only possible item of property for this Court to value and distribute would be the actual medical education that I received from ROSS University, not LIU, not the Medical License, and not the BOARD CERTIFICATION that I will first sit for the written exam in November 2009, some 19 months post commencement and the Oral Exam in April 2010, some 24 months Post-Commencement." Defendant's Right to Share in Plaintiff's Medical License and/or Enhanced Earnings
The Law
Pursuant to DRL §236(B)(1)(c),
marital property is broadly defined as "property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held." In the landmark case of O'Brien v. O'Brien (66 NY2d 576 [1985]) (O'Brien), the Court of Appeals held that a professional license could constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution to the extent that it is acquired during the marriage. In further explaining this decision, the Court of Appeals later stated that "[t]he statute is sweeping and 'recognizes that spouses have an equitable claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship'" (DeJesus v. DeJesus, 90 NY2d 643, 646 [1997], quoting O'Brien, 66 NY2d at 583). "By broadly defining the term 'marital property', [the statute] intended to give effect to the 'economic partnership' concept of the marriage relationship (Price v. Price, 69 NY2d 8, 15 [1986]; Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 NY2d 481 [1984]). It was accordingly then left it to the courts to determine what interests constitute marital property" (Elkus v. Elkus, 169 AD2d 134, 136 [1991], lv dismissed 79 NY2d 851 [1992]) (Elkus).
As is also relevant herein, in further refining the scope of the rule of the O'Brien case, in McGowan v. McGowan (142 AD2d 355 [1988]) (McGowan), the Appellate Division, Second Department, explained that:
"Any difficulty that may be thought to exist in deciding these issues is markedly diminished by considering that the rationale espoused by the O'Brien court is essentially founded upon the concept that a professional license is a thing of value mainly, if not solely, because of the 'enhanced earning capacity it affords the holder' (O'Brien v. O'Brien, supra, at 588). Since an academic degree may, under various circumstances, similarly enhance the earning potential of its holder, we see no valid basis upon which to distinguish such degrees from the professional licenses which pursuant to O'Brien are subject to equitable distribution. Also, considering that the enhancement of one spouse's earning capacity is the thing of value subject to equitable distribution pursuant to the O'Brien case, we conclude that such enhancement of earning capacity is acquired when it is actually achieved, that is, when the work that gave rise to it is finally completed, not at some later point when the completion of that work is formally recognized by the conferral of a degree or license. "
(McGowan, 142 AD2d at 356-357 [emphasis added by this court]). The court went on to hold that the teaching certificate that was awarded to plaintiff approximately two weeks after the marriage ceremony, where plaintiff had completed the requirements for that degree before the parties' marriage, was not marital property. In contrast, however, the Masters degree which was subsequently conferred upon her was considered to be marital property, since it reflected the successful completion of a course of study undertaken during the marriage (McGowan, 142 AD2d at 357). As is also useful herein, in so holding, the court noted that:
"The husband's argument is...that, since the plaintiff's teaching certificate was acquired during the marriage, all of the enhancement of earning potential that it represents must also be deemed to have been acquired during the marriage. This, however, is obviously not the case. The real thing of value, that is, the plaintiff's increased skill, knowledge and ability, her 'human capital', as it were, was acquired before the marriage and must therefore be deemed separate property."
(McGowan, 142 AD2d at 362 [1988]).
Subsequent cases interpreting O'Brien have further expanded upon the enhanced earning capacity that may be subject to equitable distribution. For example, in Holihan v. Holihan (159 AD2d 685 [1990]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the husband's license as a guidance counselor, which was obtained following a course of study during the marriage, constituted marital property. In Elkus, after noting that "[t]here is no rational basis upon which to distinguish between a degree, a license, or any other special skill that generates substantial income" (Elkus, 169 AD2d at 138), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the celebrity status of a skilled opera singer was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution. In Mitnick v. Rosentha (260 AD2d 238, 239 [1999], lv dismissed 94 NY2d 797 [2000], lv denied 95 NY2d 769 [2000]), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the wife's fellowships were properly found to be subject to equitable distribution upon evidence that they enhanced her earning capacity. In Hougie v. Hougie (261 AD2d 161, 162 [1999]), the same court held that defendant's enhanced earning capacity as an investment banker was subject to equitable distribution, regardless of whether or not such a career requires a license, and that the Series 7 securities license, which is necessary to trade securities in the United States, that he obtained during the marriage should be taken into account in determining his enhanced earning capacity. In Murtha v. Murtha (264 AD2d 552, 553 [1999], lv dismissed 95 NY2d 791 [2000]), the Appellate Division, First Department, held that the husband's Chartered Financial Analyst certification enhanced his earning capacity, and although not a prerequisite for employment and/or advancement, was subject to equitable distribution because he was promoted after receiving it and his compensation more than doubled. In Spence v. Spence (287 AD2d 447, 448 [2001], lv dismissed 97 NY2d 725 [2002]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, declining to follow the holding in Hougie, found that the husband's enhanced earning capacity as an investment banker was not marital property subject to equitable distribution under circumstances where he earned his MBA, Series 7 license and Series 63 license four years before the marriage, so that his increased earning capacity was not attributable to a professional license or degree acquired during the marriage. In Judge v. Judge (48 AD3d 424 [2008]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that defendant's MBA degree was a marital assert subject to equitable distribution, explaining that an academic degree may constitute a marital asset subject to equitable distribution, even though the degree may not necessarily confer the legal right to engage in a particular profession, since the record demonstrated that the degree substantially increased the wife's future earnings.
In other cases, the court has held that the portion of the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity resulting from the education acquired during the marriage is a marital asset. Hence, for example, in McAlpine v. McAlpine (176 AD2d 285 [1991]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that only that portion of the husband's fellowship represented by the last five examinations could be treated as marital property since the fellowship, which required the study of mathematics and the successful passage of ten examinations, was largely obtained pre-maritally, and defendant graduated from college and passed five of the examinations before he was married. Similarly, in Hickey v. Hickey (256 AD2d 383 [1998]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that since plaintiff's nursing license was a result, in part, of an educational process which began before the marriage, it could not, in its entirety, be distributed as marital property, and remitted the matter for a hearing to determine the number of credits earned by plaintiff toward the license before the marriage, and to recalculate defendant's share of the license. In Gandhi v. Gandhi (283 AD2d 782 [2001], the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that some part of the value of plaintiff's CPA license was attributable to activities conducted during the marriage and accordingly constituted marital property, even though plaintiff received considerable formal education in business administration and accounting in India; was qualified as a "chartered" accountant, which is India's equivalent of a CPA license; he worked in that capacity for a number of years; and he obtained his license here after taking only two additional during the evening, while he remained employed as a full-time accountant, because his actual earnings substantially increased following the CPA. In Miklos v. Miklos (9 AD3d 397 [2004]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in determining that plaintiff was entitled to 50 percent of the two-thirds portion of defendant's enhanced earning capacity which the Supreme Court determined was marital property, since defendant worked full time as a pharmacist the entire time he attended law school, he had a full scholarship to attend law school, the parties married after defendant completed his first year of law school and they did not have any children at that time. In Carman v. Carman (22 AD3d 1004, 1007 [2005]), the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that 20 percent of defendant's CPA license was marital property where he completed a Bachelor's degree and almost one year of the required two years of practice before the marriage, and during the marriage, finished the remaining practice period, took an exam preparation course and passed all portions of the CPA exam, since the expert's 20 percent figure represented one sixth of defendant's education and practical experience with a slight increase for exam preparation and successful completion, as the marital portion of defendant's enhanced earning capacity. In Chamberlain v. Chamberlain (24 AD3d 589 [2005]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the trial court providently exercised its discretion in awarding defendant 30 percent of the value of the degrees and license that constituted the enhanced earning capacity achieved by plaintiff during the marriage, based upon his indirect contributions to the attainment of that enhanced earning capacity by paying all of the family's living expenses while plaintiff was a student and modifying his employment schedule in order to enable him to care for the parties' older child, who was born during that period.
In contrast, however, in Fruchter v. Fruchter (29 AD3d 942 [2006]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that since it was undisputed that plaintiff did not finish the required courses to obtain an MBA degree and did not take all three CFA examinations required to receive that certification, and his MBA and CFA studies were not completed, any enhanced earning capacity which may result upon completion of these studies would not constitute marital property. Similarly, in Kyle v. Kyle (156 AD2d 508 [1989]), the same court held that defendant's application to reopen the trial for the purpose of taking testimony regarding the value of plaintiff's principal's license and determining the amount, if any, to which defendant was entitled with respect to that license was properly denied. In so holding, the court reasoned that since plaintiff testified at trial that he still needed two courses in order to obtain his principal's license, he never completed the educational requirements for a principal's license and he did not acquire his principal's license during the marriage, his uncompleted course of studies in possible anticipation of obtaining a principal's license in the future did not constitute marital property susceptible to equitable distribution.
In addition, it has been recently reiterated by the Appellate Division, Second Department, that:
"'[I]t is...incumbent upon the nontitled party seeking a distributive share of such assets to demonstrate that they made a substantial contribution to the titled party's acquisition of that marital asset' and [w]here only modest contributions are made by the nontitled spouse toward the other spouse's attainment of a degree or professional license, and the attainment is more directly the result of the titled spouse's own ability, tenacity, perseverance and hard work, it is appropriate for courts to limit the distributed amount of that enhanced earning capacity'" (Higgins v. Higgins, 50 AD3d 852, 853, quoting Brough v. Brough, 285 AD2d 913, 914-915, and Farrell v. Cleary-Farrell, 306 AD2d 597, 599-600; see Vora v. Vora, 268 AD2d 470, 471.
(Kriftcher v. Kriftcher, 59 AD3d 392, 393 [2009]; accord Guha v. Guha, ___ AD3d ___, 2009 NY Slip Op 2748, 1-2 [2009]). Accordingly, by way of illustration, in Duspiva v. Duspiva (181 AD2d 810 [1992]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding defendant a share of plaintiff's enhanced earning capacity resulting from his degree and certification as a public accountant, since she failed to show that she had made a substantial contribution to this asset. In so holding, the court noted that plaintiff continued to provide the main support for the family and he pursued his studies largely unaided, since defendant neither sacrificed her career, never assumed a disproportionate share of household work as a consequence of plaintiff's studies and chose not to work outside the home for nearly a year while plaintiff attended college and held down a full-time job. More recently, in Higgins v. Higgins (50 AD3d 852 [2008]), the same court held that the trial court improvidently exercised its discretion in awarding defendant a share of plaintiff's enhanced earning capacity where defendant did not demonstrate that his contributions were substantial in that he offered no evidence to establish that he made career sacrifices or assumed a disproportionate share of household work as a consequence of plaintiff's education, particularly since plaintiff worked full time while attending school, funded some of her own educational costs, and was still the primary caregiver for the parties' children.
Discussion
As a preliminarily issue, the court notes "that whether a particular marital asset, such as the enhanced earning capacity attributable to a particular career, is subject to equitable distribution is an issue that can be decided prior to trial" (Hougie, 261 AD2d at 161-162, citing Elkus; West v. West, 213 AD2d 1025 [1995], lv dismissed 86 NY2d 885 [1995]).
The undisputed facts of this case establish that the parties were married on June 26, 1993. During the marriage, plaintiff attended LIU so as to enable him to enroll in Medical School; he attended Medical School from January 2001 through April 2002; and he received a degree on April 1, 2005. He was a resident at New York Hospital Queens from July 1, 2005 to June 30, 2006; from July 1, 2006 through the present, he has been a resident at Nassau University Medical Center. Further, he took and passed the three USMLEs necessary to obtain a medical license on December 20, 2002, May 28, 2004 and November 26, 2007. Thereafter, on April 24, 2008, this action was commenced.
Applying the above principles of law to the facts of this case, plaintiff's education at LIU, which was a necessary prerequisite to his acceptance at Medical School, is a marital asset (generally Hassanin v. Hassanin, 279 AD2d 550 [2001] [defendant's undergraduate degree in engineering was marital property and plaintiff was entitled to a portion of his enhanced earning capacity]); as is his medical degree and the two years and nine months of his residency, since this education and training are held to have contributed to his enhanced earning capacity as an anesthesiologist, so that these marital assets are found to be subject to equitable distribution (see R.R. v. P.R., 298 AD2d 169 [2002] [in making the distributive award, the court was appropriately cognizant of the value of plaintiff's medical specialty, even though plaintiff was not yet board certified in that specialty at the time of trial]; see generally Judge, 48 AD3d 424; Chamberlain, 24 AD3d 589; Carman, 22 AD3d 1004; Miklos, 9 AD3d 397; Spence, 287 AD2d 447; Gandhi, 283 AD2d 782; Murtha, 264 AD2d 552; Hougie, 261 AD2d 161; Mitnick, 260 AD2d 238; Hickey, 256 AD2d 383; McAlpine, 176 AD2d 285; Elkus, 169 AD2d 134; Holihan, 159 AD2d 685; McGowan,142 AD2d 355 ), as is the enhanced earning capacity resulting from passing the three exams (id.). This holding finds further support in Vainchenker v. Vainchenker (242 AD2d 620 [1997]), wherein the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that:
"Although the husband was a practicing physician in Russia prior to the parties' marriage, his earning capacity in the United States was enhanced due to the medical training he received in this country during the marriage. The Supreme Court therefore properly determined that the husband's New York medical license was a marital asset subject to equitable distribution (see generally, McSparron v. McSparron, 87 NY2d 275; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576; Shoenfeld v. Shoenfeld, 168 AD2d 674).
(Vainchenker, 242 AD2d at 621 [1997]).
The court also finds plaintiff's reliance upon Fructer and Kyle to argue that his education and training does not constitute marital assets subject to equitable distribution to be unpersuasive, since both of those cases are distinguishable. More specifically, the plaintiff in Fruchter did not finish the required courses to obtain an MBA degree and did not take all three CFA examinations required to receive that certification, so that his MBA and CFA studies were uncompleted. Similarly, the plaintiff in Kyle still needed two additional courses in order to obtain his principal's license, he never completed those educational requirements and he did not acquire his principal's license during the marriage. Herein, plaintiff's education was completed as of the date of the commencement of the action, as were two years and nine months of his residency.
Further, as the above discussion of law reveals, and is impliedly admitted by plaintiff, courts routinely apportion the value of the enhanced earning capacity resulting from courses of study both before and during the marriage. While the instant case is different in that plaintiff was not eligible to receive his medical license for three months after the commencement of the action, it is not disputed that from January 10, 2000 through the date of commencement, plaintiff was working towards acquiring this license. If a spouse is permitted to avoid equitable distribution of enhanced earning capacity by commencing an action after the necessary education has been acquired, but before the sought after license is obtained, the rationale behind O'Brien would be abrogated. Moreover, as noted above, under the facts of this case, where plaintiff completed the training necessary to obtain a medical license within three months of the commencement of the action, there is no speculation with regard to whether the necessary studies will be completed.
The court also finds plaintiff's assertion that defendant did not substantially contribute to his education to be unpersuasive. In this regard, plaintiff admits that defendant worked full time throughout the marriage and that she provided most of the support for the family while he was attending LIU and at least some of the support while he was in Medical School and while he was a resident. Although defendant argues that defendant attended school during this time, she also took care of the parties' son, albeit with the assistance of plaintiff's parents. The court further finds plaintiff's contention that defendant did not care for him while he was attending Medical School in Dominica or while he was in Miami to be disingenuous, since during this time, defendant cared for the parties' son without any assistance from plaintiff, in addition to working so that the family's expenses could be met. Finally, she went to school part-time, at night, so that plaintiff could pursue his studies on a full time basis. The court accordingly holds that defendant made a contribution to plaintiff's enhanced earning capacity, with the amount of such contribution to be determined at trial. In determining the share of the enhanced earning capacity to which defendant is entitled, the court can entertain the argument that the parties separated in December 2005.
Defendant's Request for Attorneys' Fees
The Parties' Contentions
In support of her request for attorneys' fees, defendant argues that an award of fees is appropriate pursuant to DRL §237 because plaintiff's motion is without merit. She accordingly requests an award of $5,500, based upon an hourly rate of $340.
In opposition to the wife's cross motion, the husband contends that her failure to file a Statement of Net Worth renders her request defective. He further avers that she has not demonstrated a balance of the equities or provided any statements or invoices detailing the time spent on the matter.
Discussion
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR §202.16(k)(2), "[n]o motion shall be heard unless the moving papers include a statement of net worth in the official form prescribed by subdivision (b) of this section." Pursuant to 22 NYCRR §202.16(k)(3):
"No motion for counsel fees shall be heard unless the moving papers also include the affidavit of the movant's attorney stating the moneys, if any, received on account of such attorney's fee from the movant or any other person on behalf of the movant, and the moneys such attorney has been promised by, or the agreement made with, the movant or other persons on behalf of the movant, concerning or in payment of the fee."
Accordingly, defendant's failure to submit a net worth statement renders her application for an award of an attorney's fee defective, so that the application would have to be denied without prejudice to renewal upon compliance with the applicable requirements (see Bertone v. Bertone, 15 AD3d 326 [2005]; Fischer-Holland v. Walker, 12 AD3d 671 [2004]; Matter of Cooke v. Alaimo, 44 AD10393 [2007]; Lifshutz v. Rockfield, 300 AD2d 366 [2002]; Cole v. Cole, 283 AD2d 602, 603 [2001]). Inasmuch as the instant motion can be considered in making a determination of whether defendant shall be awarded attorneys' fees at the termination of this action, the court grants defendant leave to renew her application upon the submission of proper papers later in this proceeding.
In so holding, the court further notes that an award of attorney's fees is not proper pursuant to DRL §237 under circumstances where the award is sought as a sanction for alleged improper or dilatory conduct, since a sanction can only be awarded pursuant to and in accordance with the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, 22 NYCRR §130-1.1 (see e.g. Landes v. Landes, 248 AD2d 268 [1998] [an award of $ 7,000 to the husband's attorney, described by the court as a "fine for this patently frivolous action," rendered it a sanction and not an award of attorney's fees, and as such, it must comply with the requirements of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(d)]; accord Gober v. Gober, 11 AD3d 261 [2004] [plaintiff's request for counsel and expert fees pursuant to DRL §237, based upon defendant's allegedly obstructive litigation conduct, was properly denied on the ground that the divorce judgment put the parties in financial parity and made each a multi-millionaire; under the circumstances, plaintiff's remedy was to seek counsel and expert fees as a form of sanction under 22 NYCRR part 130]; Silverman v. Silverman, 304 AD2d 41, 48 [2003] [an award of counsel fees that did not serve to level the playing field, but would serve merely to punish the adverse spouse for what the court viewed as wasteful, frivolous litigation conduct, was impermissible as punitive nature; such award should instead be sought under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1]).
Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, all relief requested in the motion and cross motion is denied. Counsels shall appear on July 20, 2009.
The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of this court.
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| July 07, 2009 |
| Enhanced Earnings, Enhanced Confusion |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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Sorry for the delay in between posts, I will be updating this blog more consistently in the future. Here is a recent article in the New York Law Journal where Judge Lebowitz of Queens County Court of Claims and Acting Judge of the Supreme Court comments on the confusion that landmark decision in
O'Brien v. O'Brien has created. Judge Lebowitz also comments on how New York is the only state in the country that still requires grounds for a divorce, which in practice only causes people to tell lies on the stand. This article makes several interesting points, feel free to add what you think below.
New York Law Journal
Divorce, New York Style
By Jeffrey D. Lebowitz
June 29, 2009
(The following article is based on a speech delivered by Judge Jeffrey D. Lebowitz to the Family and Divorce Mediation Council of Greater New York on June 11.)
Congratulations on the 25th anniversary of the Family and Divorce Mediation Council of Greater New York. It is my feeling that this organization is more relevant, more meaningful today to the practice of Family Law than it was 25 years ago.
When this group started,
equitable distribution had just been enacted, the courts and lawyers were feeling their way and the body of law that has since developed was in its nascent stage. Today, in my opinion, after almost six years in the Matrimonial Part and 16 years as a judge, the practice of Matrimonial and Family law is, not to mince words, a mess.
While New York is a glamorous place to get married, it is a tough place to get divorced. We have created such elaborate laws and concepts that only the most collegial of divorcing couples and attorneys can navigate the morass we now know as matrimonial practice. Unfortunately, if one or both sides insists on litigating, or one or both lawyers do not see the benefit of
early mediation or settlement, we are off to the races.
The litigants. Divorcing couples are in a sensitive and stressful time in their lives. Research has shown that other than the death of a spouse or close family member, the most trying time in a person's life is when they are going through a dissolution of their marriage.
That can never change. Those emotions will always be in the case. That is where mediation can be of tremendous value. The ability to collaboratively resolve cases, the opportunity for the litigants to feel that they have a say in the dissolution of their marriage, that someone is listening to them about what has occurred at the hands of the other party, all go a long way toward prompt settlement and perhaps more importantly, a lasting resolution.
The courtroom is not a place for catharsis or open ended speeches by litigants. I have little time to hear out litigants in depth, not only because of time constraints, but because I believe they are inimical to the settlement of a case, opening up a so-called Pandora's box of ill will that can only be reciprocated by similar statements from the opposing side.
The state of the law. We have developed in New York theoretical concepts that no other state has seen fit to follow. When Equitable Distribution began in 1980, it was a concerted attempt to help the non-monied spouse, usually, the wife. It was well intentioned and necessary. As long as the distribution of marital property was awarded by title, the non-titled, non-monied spouse was at a severe disadvantage, but as with many things, when a wrong is righted, we often swing the pendulum too far the other way. This is where we are today in matrimonial practice.
Perhaps the most glaring example is the concept of enhanced earnings. Enhanced earnings is nothing more than a crap shoot based on facts and circumstances that may or may not occur, and unlike maintenance or child support, is not subject to modification if those circumstances do not bear out. Using a variety of discount rates and different methodologies to calculate enhanced earnings only add to the problem.
We are starting to see the courts rebelling against these concepts. The most recent cases seem to put a cap on enhanced earnings at around 20 percent, and often as little as 10 percent, unless it is a case similar to O'Brien, (O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 498 NYS2d 743 (1985)), which started this whole fiasco, where the non-license holding spouse puts a license holding spouse through school, helps him or her study, brings in the money, feeds the kids, puts them to sleep. Then maybe 50 per cent is warranted.
The answer is simple, eliminate enhanced earnings and provide a stream of income that is not subject to termination just because the non-license holding spouse remarries or dies. A stream of income will take into account all the variables that enhanced earning evaluators can only guess at in reports and will reflect the real world value of the asset over a specified period of time.
Appreciation of separate property is a tempest in a teapot. We have to establish the value of the property at the commencement of the marriage and of the matrimonial action. Then we need to look at how much of the appreciation was subject to market forces, so-called "passive appreciation," which is not subject to distribution, and the amount of appreciation that is a result of the contributions of each side. We then have to decide how each contribution is valued in terms of equitable distribution.
I suggest that the concept of appreciation of separate property, which is statutory in nature, should be eliminated and replaced by either providing appreciation of separate property regardless of contribution, to be subject to equitable distribution, or let separate property remain separate property during a marriage regardless of appreciation. Take your pick, but a bright line rule will help avoid the confusion that now ensues between the appellate departments and the trial courts in dealing with the issue of appreciation of separate property.
Grounds. Then, of course, there is the issue of grounds, where again, we lag pitifully behind all 49 states. This great cosmopolitan State of New York still requires people to fib on the stand about establishing their grounds. The Assembly has held this bill captive and now is trying to barter guidelines for maintenance similar to that for child support in return for agreeing to establish no-fault divorce. Guidelines for maintenance will only complicate matters since, unlike child support, maintenance is not always awarded and, in fact, is becoming a vanishing issue in the era of two income earning families.
I feel I am in the company of similarly minded individuals, who believe the best interest of the litigants is served by a prompt resolution in a fair and reasonable manner. However, we still have many lawyers who look at a case and don't think about settlement first. If they are experienced, they understand the parameters of a fair settlement from the outset of the case. Unfortunately, there are still a significant number of lawyers who view litigation as a "cash cow" and as long as they litigate the more that they can milk that cow.
That's why, you and I, and others similarly situated have taken a step forward and concluded that the litigation process, the adversarial process, in many cases is inimical to the best interest of parties.
I am hopeful that over time, more judges and attorneys will understand that alternatives to litigation, such as mediation and arbitration, should become the vehicle of first resort, not the last, to resolve matrimonial matters. Only then can we begin to improve the harrowing experience of divorce in this state.
Mediation Pilot Program: Queens County is introducing a pilot mediation program. The administrative judge's office will be accepting applications for mediators until the end of June. We have rigorous standards that must be met before one is even eligible to apply. It is very important that we have the most experienced mediators available. If we do not and this program fails to get off to a successful start, we may be doomed to failure. Once all resumes are submitted, a relatively small number of mediators will be selected for the initial phase of the program.
We don't know how many cases will be sent to mediation. We don't know if it will be eventually used by the other matrimonial judges in Queens County. If more cases are sent to mediation and more judges become involved, there is a reasonable chance additional attorneys will be selected to join the panel.
Generally speaking, the program will allow a judge to send any case out to mediation at any point in the litigation. At the first mediation session, there will be no charge. At the conclusion of the initial session, if the litigants want to continue with mediation, financial arrangements will be worked out with the mediator, with a fee cap of $200 per hour. The pro rata obligations will be fixed by the parties or the court.
The matter will, thereafter, be adjourned for mediation. The content of the mediation is privileged and will not be brought to the attention of the court. However, within 75 days, the matter will be returned to the court where we will continue litigation or place a settlement on the record in keeping with the mediation agreement. Despite the 75 days set forth in our protocol, I will not concern myself with an arbitrary adherence to the protocol. If I am told that mediation is working but more time is needed, I will provide the parties with a reasonable period of time to work out their differences.
Any matter that is unresolved may be subject to mediation, whether it be financial, custodial or grounds.
We have taken steps to avoid situations where there is a gross imbalance in the respective positions of the parties, financial or emotional, to avoid the mediation process. It is also agreed that if there are real issues of domestic violence, then mediation may not be appropriate.
I believe that this pilot program is in keeping with your organization's mission statement, "to increase public awareness in the use of family and divorce mediation."
I look forward to all of us continuing to play a meaningful part in mediation throughout this city and state as we collaboratively attempt to clean up the mess I have come to think of as "Divorce, New York Style."
Jeffrey D. Lebowitz is a judge of the Court of Claims and Acting Supreme Court Justice in Queens County assigned to the matrimonial term. The opinions expressed in this article are his own.
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| August 23, 2008 |
| Do Not Forget Your Credit |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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Recently the the Appellate Division held that payment of premarital debt with marital funds should be credited as an asset of the marriage. This case is extremely important. If graduate school loans for medical, dental or law school were paid during the marriage, or your spouse's student loans for college were repaid, you are entitled to a credit. Read the following case and be enlightened: In Mahoney-Buntzman v Buntzman, --- N.Y.S.2d ----, 2008 WL 2066586 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.) Supreme Court, among other things, fixed the wife's her distributive award at $2,467,151.43, awarded her 35% of the value of certain shares of stock and stock options issued to the defendant by his employer, and awarded her durational maintenance of $2,500 a month for 15 months.
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| August 23, 2008 |
| Credit Counts Again |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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Although the following case comes out of the fourth department, many married individuals pay off Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York. Craig J. MIRAND, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lisa M. MIRAND, Defendant-Appellant. July 11, 2008 James P. Renda, Buffalo, for Defendant-Appellant. Rosenthal, Siegel & Muenkel, LLP, Buffalo (Barbara A. Piazza of Counsel), for Plaintiff-Respondent. MARTOCHE, J.P., SMITH, CENTRA, LUNN, AND PINE, JJ. MEMORANDUM: On appeal from a judgment in this action for divorce and ancillary relief, defendant contends that Supreme Court erred in awarding plaintiff sole custody of the parties' child and directing defendant to pay child support. We reject that contention. Great deference is accorded to the court's custody determination where, as here, that determination is based upon the court's assessment of the credibility and character of the parties (see Wideman v. Wideman, 38 AD3d 1318, 1319;Matter of Vincent A.B. v. Karen T., 30 AD3d 1100, 1101-1102,lv denied7 NY3d 711;Matter of Nunnery v. Nunnery, 275 A.D.2d 986, 987). We conclude that the court's determination has a sound and substantial basis in the record and should not be disturbed (see Matter of Pinkerton v. Pensyl, 305 A.D.2d 1113;Matter of Thayer v. Ennis, 292 A.D.2d 824).
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| July 03, 2008 |
| What is the Proper Valuation Date? |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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The Court of Appeals recently ruled that the proper valuation date for all marital property is the date the summons for divorce is filed. An older discontinued action shall not serve as the valuation date.
In Mesholam v Mesholam, 6/27/2008 NYLJ 30, (col. 1) the Court of Appeals, in an Opinion by Judge Pigott, held that the commencement of a prior, discontinued divorce action may not serve as the valuation date for marital property for purposes of equitable distribution in a later divorce action. Courts must use the commencement date of the later, successful action as the earliest valuation date for marital property. However, the circumstances surrounding the commencement of the earlier action can and should be considered as a factor by the trial court, among other relevant factors, as it attempts to calibrate the ultimate equitable distribution of marital economic partnership property acquired after the start of such an action by either spouse.
The parties were married in 1969. The wife commenced an action for divorce in 1994. The husband answered, but did not counterclaim for divorce. Five years later the Supreme Court granted the wife's motion to discontinue the action. Almost immediately, the husband commenced this action for divorce. After finding that the husband was entitled to a divorce Supreme Court held that the husband's pension must be valued as of the commencement date of the present action, rather than the commencement date of the wife's 1994 action, relying on Domestic Relations Law §236(B)(4)(b). Supreme Court determined that the marital property, including the marital portion of the pension, should be divided equally between the parties. The Appellate Division held Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in valuing the pension as of the commencement date of the present action. It concluded that the 'appropriate valuation date was the commencement date of the 1994 action' because there was 'no evidence that the parties reconciled and continued to receive the benefits of the marital relationship after the prior action was commenced' (25 AD3d 670, 671 [2006]).
The Court of Appeals modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the matter to Supreme Court for further proceedings. It pointed out that Domestic Relations Law 236(B)(1)(c) defines marital property as all property acquired 'during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action.' Thus, in the absence of a separation agreement, the commencement date of a matrimonial action demarcates 'the termination point for the further accrual of marital property ' (citing Anglin v. Anglin, 80 NY2d 553, 556 [1992]). The Court held that the valuation date must be between 'the date of commencement of the action and the date of trial ' (Domestic Relations Law 236 [B][4][b]). In determining whether the commencement of a particular 'matrimonial action' terminates the accrual of marital property, it looked to 'the overall legislative intent of the Domestic Relations Law and the particular application of the equitable distribution regime. In Anglin, the Court held that the commencement of a separation action does not cut off the accrual of marital property because such an action does not, ipso facto, terminate the marital economic partnership. Rather, the economic partnership should be considered dissolved when a matrimonial action is commenced which seeks divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, i.e., an action in which equitable distribution is available. It observed that this rule provides internal consistency and compatibility and objective verification, as opposed to uneven, ephemeral, personal interpretations as to when economic marital partnerships end. For similar reasons, it concluded that the value of marital property generally should not be determined by the commencement of an action for divorce that does not ultimately culminate in divorce. Equitable distribution is available 'in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce. Where there is no divorce, there can be no equitable distribution. Consequently, permitting the commencement date of the prior, unsuccessful divorce action to govern the valuation date of marital property for the purposes of a later, successful action in which equitable distribution is available would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The Court found that, as Supreme Court concluded, the pension benefits were marital property to the extent that they were earned prior to the commencement of the present divorce action. As a result, the marital portion of the pension could not be valued at any time earlier than the commencement date.
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| June 10, 2008 |
| Enhanced Earnings |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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| Just because a license or a degree is acquired during the marriage, it does not mean that a Judge has to divide the assets. In the following divorce case in New York the appellate division reversed the trial judge.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Dawn HIGGINS, appellant,
v.
Davis HIGGINS, respondent.
Apr. 15, 2008
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from (1) stated portions of a judgment of divorce of the Supreme Court, Orange County (Horowitz, J .), dated July 28, 2006, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the defendant 30% of her enhanced earnings, and failed to direct the sale of the marital residence, and (2) stated portions of findings of facts and conclusions of law of the same court also dated July 28, 2006.
ORDERED that the appeal from the findings of fact and conclusions of law is dismissed, as findings of fact and conclusions of law are not separately appealable (see Matter of County of Westchester v. O'Neill, 191 A.D.2d 556); and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof (1) awarding the defendant a 30% credit for his equitable share of the plaintiff's enhanced earnings resulting from her Bachelor's Degree and Master's Degree valued at $306,000 as credited against the plaintiff's share of the marital residence, (2) awarding the defendant a credit for one half of the payments he made on a loan against his Ford Motor Company Savings Plan, (3) awarding the defendant a credit for payments of the mortgage, taxes, homeowner's insurance, and other expenses connected with the marital residence, (4) awarding the plaintiff child support, (5) fixing child support arrears, and (6) awarding the plaintiff child care expenses; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for a determination of the husband's income, and a recalculation of child care expenses, child support, and child support arrears, taking into account any credit due for amounts paid by the husband pursuant to the pendente lite order.
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| May 06, 2008 |
| Is Every Case 50/50? |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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| In New York Divorce cases, Judges divide property subject to New York's equitable distribution law. In many cases Judges divide all property equally. If the marriage is a true economic partnership, generally everything will be divided equally. In the following case a successful
New York Divorce lawyer argued that one side was entitled to much less than half.
K. v. B., 13 A.D.3d 12, 784 N.Y.S.2d 76 (First Dept. 2004)(2004 WL 2525121)(2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 08003)(Nov 09, 2004):
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
K., Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
B., Defendant-Appellant.
Nov. 9, 2004.
This appeal presents an unusual set of facts, whose most pertinent aspects are substantially set forth in the dissent. The parties' marriage was unconventional in certain ways, but that lack of convention does not, as the defendant-husband would have it, trump the settled equitable distribution principles which have evolved in New York since 1980. For that reason we most respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague(s) and affirm the trial court.
CRUEL AND INHUMAN TREATMENT
Without citing any legal authority, the husband argues that the wife could not establish cruel and inhuman treatment as a ground for divorce since the parties did not cohabit, but rather maintained separate residences-the wife in Manhattan and the husband in Putnam County. However, in considering a cause of action for cruel and inhuman treatment, the fact-finder should focus primary attention on the nature of the interaction between a husband and wife, rather than on the type of living arrangement they have.
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| April 25, 2008 |
| Sometimes It Does Not Pay to Go to Trial |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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Most divorces are settled by agreement. A few go to trial. The only certainty in a divorce trial is that nobody knows how a Judge will rule. Read the following case that was decided by the appellate division. Apparently the Judge got some things right and some things wrong.
67.2.12 - - - Johnson v. Chapin
Johnson v. Chapin, --- A.D.3d ---, --- N.Y.S.2d --- (First Dept. 2008)(2008 WL 664929)(2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 02203)(Mar. 13, 2008):
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.
Janet M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Allan M. CHAPIN, Defendant-Appellant.
Mar. 13, 2008
TOM, J.P., MAZZARELLI, FRIEDMAN, BUCKLEY, McGUIRE, JJ.
Judgment of divorce and money judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (John E.H. Stackhouse, J.), entered May 17 and September 23, 2005, inter alia, distributing the parties' marital property and awarding plaintiff maintenance, child support and counsel fees, modified, on the law and the facts, (1) to reduce the wife's share of the enhanced value of the Claverack property to 25%; (2) to vacate the credit to the wife for 50% of the difference between the sum expended on the Claverack renovations and the property's appreciated value; and (3) to credit the husband (a) $548,460 for excess temporary maintenance payments and (b) $484,370.50, 50% of the mortgage and maintenance paid for the Fifth Avenue cooperative during the pendency of the divorce action, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.
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| July 17, 2007 |
| The Family Jewels |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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It is a common misconception that jewelry is necessarily the separate property of the wife and is never subject to equitable distribution. In fact, many people don't even mention jewelry when discussing assets during a divorce case. See the excerpt below for an example of equitable distribution of jewelry and don't forget to discuss your family jewels with your attorney.
Excerpt from Ciaffone v. Ciaffone, 645 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1996).
Supreme Court's classification of certain items of jewelry given plaintiff by defendant during the marriage as marital property was correct (see, Chase v Chase, 208 A.D.2d 883, 884, 618 N.Y.S.2d 94). It should, however, have given plaintiff a credit of $1,724 for the evidence shows that these funds were plaintiff's separate property which she utilized to purchase a ring. This credit reduces the distributive value of the jewelry to $7,676 ($9,400 - $1,724) and plaintiff's distributive award therein to $3,070.
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| July 03, 2007 |
| Is My Inheritance Safe? |
| Posted By Brian D. Perskin |
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| The question of whether or not an inheritance is subject to equitable distribution has gotten a lot of attention. Take a look at the following excerpt from
Spencer v. Spencer which finds that inheritance is separate property, but its appreciated value is marital property...
Excerpt from Stencer v. Stencer,646 N.Y.S.2d 674, 230 A.D.2d 645
Decided August 15, 1996
The trial court properly concluded that an inheritance received by the plaintiff from his brother and sister, and thereafter placed in the Merrill Lynch investment account, was his separate property upon receipt, and that he continued to maintain this asset as separate throughout the marriage ( McGarrity v McGarrity, 211 A.D.2d 669, 622 N.Y.S.2d 521; Alaimo v Alaimo, 199 A.D.2d 1039, 606 N.Y.S.2d 117; Feldman v Feldman, supra). The fact that the plaintiff may have made withdrawals from his separate account to pay marital expenses does not alter this conclusion ( Feldman, supra, at 216), as there was insufficient evidence of commingling to conclude that this account was transmuted into marital property.
Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236(B) (1) (d) (3), however, the appreciation of this account, due to the plaintiff's management during the marriage, must be credited to the defendant, who is entitled to a fifty percent share of such appreciated value during the marriage as part of the marital estate. As recognized by the Court of Appeals in Price v Price (supra, at 17), "where separate property of one spouse has appreciated during the marriage and before execution of a separation agreement or commencement of a matrimonial proceeding ... 'due in part' to the contributions or efforts of the non-titled spouse as parent and homemaker, the amount of that appreciation should be added to the sum of marital property for equitable distribution" (DRL § 236 [5]; see, also, Hartog v Hartog, 194 A.D.2d 286, 291-292, 605 N.Y.S.2d 749, affd as modified by Hartog v Hartog, 85 N.Y.2d 36, 623 N.Y.S.2d 537, 647 N.E.2d 749). Here, the plaintiff used his experience in accounting and taxation to manage the investments in the inheritance accounts with his son. Since the defendant indirectly contributed to the appreciation of this asset by handling the household matters, thereby permitting her husband the freedom to devote energy to his financial endeavors ( Price, supra, at 16), her contribution should be given consideration in the distribution of the appreciated value of this asset...
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