Justice Laura E. Drager

NEW YORK COUNTY
Supreme Court

 In this matrimonial action, plaintiff (the "Wife") moves for this court to vacate the Stipulation of Settlement, dated November 6, 2006 (the "Stipulation"), and restore the action to the calender. Defendant (the "Husband") opposes the motion.

The parties married on August 15, 1997. This was a second marriage for each of the parties. There are no children of this marriage, but the wife's son (who is now fifteen) lived with the parties during the marriage. There is a disagreement as to when the parties separated. The husband claims that they separated in June 2003, and the wife claims that they separated in January 2005. The wife commenced this divorce action on August 28, 2006. On November 6, 2006, each party appeared with counsel before this court for a preliminary conference. After several hours of negotiation, the parties entered into the fully acknowledged written Stipulation and an inquest was held. (See, Aff in Opp., Exs. A, B, C).

In the instant motion, the wife claims that she did not understand the legal process, and was not informed by her attorney as to what was taking place at the conference held on November 6, 2006. The wife further contends that her attorney pressured her into signing the Stipulation. In addition, she thought the agreement resolved preliminary issues only, and was not the final resolution of the action.

" . . . [T]he court encourages property settlements through stipulation and will exercise judicial review sparingly" when the parties have resolved their matrimonial action by agreement. Lockhart v. Lockhart, 159 AD2d 283 (1st Dept. 1990). "Stipulations of settlement are favored means of resolving disputes, which should not lightly be cast aside upon conclusory and unsupported allegations of duress." Bo Young Choi v. Sei Young Choi, 167 AD2d 217, 218 (1st Dept. 1990). "This is all the more so in the case of 'open court' stipulations . . . where strict enforcement not only serves the interest of efficient dispute resolution but also is essential to the management of court calendars and integrity of the litigation process." Doppelt v. Doppelt, 215 AD2d 715 (2nd Dept. 1995). Thus, absent a showing of fraud, mistake, duress or overreaching, such stipulations will not be disturbed by the court. Christian v. Christian 42 NY2d 63 (1977).

The wife is an educated woman, having attended __________________from 1982 to1985, majoring in computer science. As the husband correctly points out, the negotiations leading to the Stipulation occurred over several hours and involved several steps. The attorneys first met with the court. They then, with participation by their clients, negotiated the terms of an agreement. The terms were committed to writing. The written Stipulation was read by each party and each of its two pages was signed by the parties and their attorneys. The parties also signed a document entitled "Affidavit of Appearance and Adoption of Oral Stipulation" that was notarized to properly acknowledge the Stipulation. Finally, a full inquest was held, during which the Wife testified to the grounds for the divorce, and each party was fully questioned under oath with respect to the terms of the Stipulation.

Throughout the proceedings on November 6th, the wife was represented by __________________., an experienced matrimonial attorney. In both writing and under oath before this court, the wife affirmatively acknowledged that she knowingly and willingly agreed to enter into the Stipulation after having conferred with her counsel.

During the oral allocution, the wife was repeatedly asked if she was entering into the Stipulation of her own free will and if she had any questions about the Stipulation. She affirmatively acknowledged under oath, on the record, that she had not been coerced into entering into the Stipulation and did so voluntarily and of her own free will. She testified that she had no questions about any of the terms of the Stipulation and that she had negotiated its terms over a period of time with the assistance of her counsel. She stated that she was satisfied with the agreement and was prepared to live up to its terms. (See, Aff. In Opp., Ex. C). Moreover, by the Affidavit of Appearance and Adoption of Oral Stipulation, the wife acknowledged in writing that "the terms of said Stipulation were fully explained and understood and that said terms were freely and voluntarily agreed to without force, fraud or duress and with advice of counsel". (See, Aff. In Opp., Ex. B).

The wife's claim that she thought the Stipulation was only a preliminary procedure is without basis. The Stipulation itself states at paragraph 7: "All claims between the parties are fully resolved by this agreement including without limitation all causes of action and all requests for further disclosure." (See, Aff. In Opp., Ex. A). Moreover, during the inquest the court made clear that the action was resolved. (Aff. In Opp., Ex. C, p. 10).

Finally, the court has reviewed the terms of the Stipulation and finds them to be neither unfair nor inequitable. The wife obtained a favorable property settlement. She received 55 percent of the marital assets ($80,000 of the husband's retirement funds).¹ In addition, the husband agreed to accept responsibility for 100 percent of the marital liabilities, including past due taxes, interest and tax penalties, as well as 100 percent of the marital credit card liabilities totaling over $90,000.² Admittedly, the wife received no maintenance pursuant to the Stipulation. The husband claims he had paid his wife voluntary support in the total amount of over $38,000 for the period of their separation. It is unclear from the wife's papers whether she concedes receiving any support. However, at least since January 2005 (the date she claims the husband left) the wife found it unnecessary to seek court ordered support until the commencement of this action in August 2006, one and a half years after the separation. The court must surmise that maintenance was not a critical issue.

The husband has no obligation to support the wife's child from a prior marriage. Indeed, the wife apparently receives support payments from that child's father.³ However, the husband has had both the wife and the child covered under his health insurance plan. He has agreed to cooperate to enable the wife to continue that insurance coverage through the provisions of COBRA, if available. The requirement that the wife pay for this cost is not unreasonable.

In sum, the court finds that the Stipulation, on its face, is not manifestly unfair to the wife.

It has been held that where parties, represented by counsel, enter into a fully executed and properly acknowledged settlement that is not manifestly unfair on its face, a court will not set aside the agreement because a party was emotionally distressed at the time the settlement was entered. See, Matuozzi v. Matuozzi, 90 AD2d 844 (2nd Dept. 1982) (wife sought to vacate agreement one day after entering it because of her claimed emotional distress); Rado v. Rado, 51 AD2d 811 (2d Dept. 1976) (wife sought to vacate agreement two weeks after entering it because of her claimed emotional distress). See also, Lockhart, supra.; Bo Young Choi, supra; Cantamessa v. Cantamessa, 170 AD2d 792 (3rd Dept. 1991). The court concludes that there is no basis to set aside the Stipulation.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the wife's motion to vacate the Stipulation and restore the action to the calendar is denied.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the court.

1. The wife's belated claim that she did not understand the meaning of the term Qualified Domestic Relations Order is without merit. The wife actively negotiated the terms of this provision. Indeed, the wife rejected the husband's initial offer of $50,000 of the retirement funds. Moreover, at the time the Stipulation was signed she had a qualified attorney available to answer any of her questions regarding the meaning of that term.

2. The wife's apparent refusal to cooperate in signing necessary tax returns is without merit. The wife agreed to cooperate with the submission of the tax returns and the husband, by the terms of the Stipulation, has agreed to be responsible for any money owed and she agreed to cooperate in signing the returns. The wife's failure to cooperate may ultimately lead to a finding that she violated the terms of the parties' contract and she may sustain liabilities.

3. Notwithstanding her claimed unfamiliarity with the litigation process, the wife has obviously been through a prior divorce proceeding. Even if that proceeding was uncontested, clearly that action required some negotiation to resolve custody and child support.